Another Document Surfaces From UK - Conditions for military action

On May 1, 2005, the Times of London released the The secret Downing Street memo which has been called the "smoking gun" that the Bush administration had already decided to invade Iraq in 2002. Now the Times of London has released another document - Cabinet Office paper: Conditions for military action. The last part of the paper is missing, but what is there clearly discusses making the case for invasion and avoiding an "illegal" war.

While there are those that argue that the "Downing Street Memo" is open to interpretation about the decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein, this recent document certainly makes that claim virtually impossible. This document, in part lays out the need for a propaganda campaign to legitimate the invasion for both the UN Security Council and the public.
From "Conditions for Military Action" (bolded in the original):

"(5) Agree to the establishment of an ad hoc group of officials under Cabinet Office Chairmanship to consider the development of an information campaign to be agreed with the US."

From the "Introduction" (emphases mine):

"When the Prime Minister discussed Iraq with President Bush at Crawford in April he said that the UK would support military action to bring about regime change, provided that certain conditions were met: efforts had been made to construct a coalition/shape public opinion, the Israel-Palestine Crisis was quiescent, and the options for action to eliminate Iraq's WMD through the UN weapons inspectors had been exhausted."

It seems from this document that there was foreknowledge that Iraq was unwilling to fight. Under item 8, it states regarding the viability of one of the invasion plans: "Notably these include the realism of the 'Running Start', the extent to which the plans are proof against Iraqi counter-attack using chemical or biological weapons and the robustness of US assumptions about the bases and about Iraqi (un)willingness to fight."

It is clear from this document (and was also part of the "Downing Street Memo") that everything would be OK if Hussein could be provoked into an attack, or a violation, first. However, Hussein did not take the bait. Whether the intensification of bombing in Iraq prior to invasion was part of a provocation plan or to eliminate possibility of Iraqi response to invasion, it failed to provoke a response. See the following bombing time line and related articles.

According to a July 19, 2003 article in the NY Times by Michael Gordon, "Lt. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, the chief allied war commander," reported that from "mid-2002 into the first few months of 2003" ... "606 bombs had been dropped on 391 carefully selected target ...".

As the invasion approached, the article states there were five goals of pre-invasion attacks:

"They wanted to neutralize the ability of the Iraqi government to command its forces; to establish control of the airspace over Iraq; to provide air support for Special Operations forces, as well as for the Army and Marine forces that would advance toward Baghdad; and to neutralize Iraq's force of surface-to-surface missiles and suspected caches of biological and chemical weapons."

Note that this is the same time the plans were underway to legitimate an invasion of Iraq. The newly released "Conditions" paper makes it clear that there was a sixth goal - goad a military response from Saddam Hussein.

It will be interesting to see if the US. corporate press are more forthcoming in reporting on this document than they were on the "Downing Street Memo." My guess is from today's headlines that they will not be. So warm up your computers and grab your pens to once more press for coverage by the media. I also recommend going to AfterDowningStreet.org and utilize their links for contacting representatives, and signing petitions related to these issues.