I came across the following on /., thought I would pass it along.

Here are the guidelines I came up for a fraud-resistant electronic voting system:

1: The traffic with the database server should be properly secured (ipsec, ssl w/client certs, etc.)

2: The data should be stored in an accountable way. For example, if the data is altered, there should be a way to determine this.

3: The system should allow manual verification of results.

So here was the system I designed:

1: Database server communicates with clients using ESP/IPSec protected communications.

2: Voting machines use touch-screens. At the end, the voting machine displays a list of candidates you voted for and asks you to confirm. Then when you do, it submits your data to the database and prints a ballot. The database also stores information relating to the ballot regarding which voting station you were at. You deposite the ballot in the ballot box.

The ballot contains: 1: An easy-to-scan bar code
2: A human readable ballot listing for manual verification. 3: The ballot serial number.

This gives you almost everything you get with the paper system as well as everything you get with the electronic system.

Looks like a good system. I am relatively sure that what eVoting is moving to is vote from home. I think that is a bad idea because then voting is 1) open to all kinds of hacking and failure, 2) unverifiable. In Oregon, we already do much of our voting by mail. A "logical next step" is computer voting from home.

If we go to electronic voting, I would rather see a system like what you suggest. Voting needs a hard copy trail in my opinion.