Taking the 2011 budget into account, the Defense Department has been given about $7.2 trillion since 1998, when the post-Cold War decline in defense spending ended. Approximately $2.5 trillion of this total is due to spending above the annual level set in 1998. This added amount constitutes the post-1998 spending surge. Military operations overseas are responsible for less than 17% of all the money spent since 1998, and for less than 50% of the funds added above 1998 levels.

 Chart 1 gives a visual overview of the rise in spending between 1998 and 2010, showing how much was allotted variously to war and to normal peace-time military activities.

 

Chart 1 also compares recent and planned spending to the averages for (1) the highest spending years of the Reagan administration and (2) the most costly years of the Vietnam war period. The result: whether one looks at total DoD spending or just that portion unrelated to overseas operations, recent and current budgets surpass the Reagan and Vietnam-era flood tides. Chart 2 gives a longer-term perspective on defense spending, looking back to 1948. All the budget figures have been converted into 2010 dollars, thus taking inflation into account.

What Chart 2 makes clear is that (1) defense spending has moved in waves historically and that (2) the most recent surge reaches uniquely high. Indeed, total spending (actual and planned) after 2001 appears much above the average for the preceding five decades. The Obama administration is contributing substantially to this trend. It plans to spend more on defense in real (inflation-adjusted) terms than did any administration since 1948 - a period encompassing the entire Cold War, including two large-scale, protracted regional wars: Korea and Vietnam. Comparing several eight-year administrations we find that:

• Ronald Reagan spent $4.1 trillion on the Defense Department (in 2010 dollars),
• G. W. Bush spent $4.65 trillion, and
• Barack Obama plans to spend more than $5 trillion.

How does the 1998-2011 spending surge compare to previous surges? The most ready comparisons are to the 1958-1968 (Kennedy-Johnson) surge of 43% and the 1975-1985 (Reagan) surge of 57%. Notably, the 1998-2011 surge is as large as these two predecessors combined.

The "Kennedy-Johnson" surge (which actually began in the last years of the Eisenhower administration) involved efforts to recapitalize the military and, later, to conduct the Vietnam war. The "Reagan" surge (which actually began in the mid-1970s) involved a shift from a conscript to a volunteer (or "professional") military, increased funding for force support, and a major program of recapitalization.

Another curious feature of the trend in defense spending apparent in Chart 2 is that the end of the Cold War looks like just another cyclical dip in the flow of funds to the Pentagon. One would hardly guess that the period 1989-1992 marked the demise of a peer global military competitor - one unlike any adversary existing today. Nor would one guess that the West had put behind itself a military contest involving dozens of well-armed nations and 30 significant insurgencies and civil conflicts.

Why Worry About Defense Spending?
Substantial concern about increased defense spending (as well as other federal spending) focuses on the recent, remarkable increase in the national debt. Chart 3 shows the change in debt, actual and projected, as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the 80-year period 1940-2019.

Much of the recent increase in debt is due to the financial crisis that commenced in 2008. However, debt accumulation is poised to continue through to the end of the period in 2019 - and beyond.

The most recent comparison to America's current circumstance are the years of the Second World War. Back then, the level of debt rose higher than it has today, but the period during which the burden exceeded 100% of GDP lasted only 4 years. Today, by contrast, it looks as though the period during which debt will equal or exceed 100% of GDP will last for more than twice as long. If we think of the mid-1940s as representing "the Mount Everest" of US debt accumulation, then the period after 2008 should represent "the Tibetan plateau" (which is not as high as Everest, but far wider.)

What feeds debt accumulation is deficit spending. Chart 4 shows deficit spending as a percentage of GDP for the years 1946-2019. Even after the deep deficits associated with the current crisis pass, the Obama administration is set on a path of deficit spending comparable (on average) to those of the period 1982-1993. This reflects the administration's decision to combine higher levels of domestic spending with high levels of defense expenditure.

Deficits and Debt - So What?
Are the planned deficits and rising debt reason for grave concern? One worry is that the mounting national debt will lead to a surge in inflation, a weakening of the dollar, and higher interest rates. But such outcomes would depend on other factors as well, for instance: Is the economy in recession and, if so, how deep? After recovery, how close is the economy to full employment? What is the overall debt burden of the nation, public and private, and is it growing, declining, or holding steady? How does the change in debt compare with the change in GDP? Is the debt ratio getting worse or better? And are there alternatives to investing in the dollar and in the United States that are both sizable and more "attractive" (that is: reliably profitable and secure)?

There are several things of which we can be sure:

• First, as Chart 3 illustrates, we are entering new territory with regard to the combined scale and duration of national
• debt.
• Second, the world is generally displeased with recent US economic leadership and some nations are actively seeking to diversify their holdings of foreign currency (although, at present, the options for "fleeing the dollar" are not inviting.)
• Third, the growth in debt and an eventual rebound in interest rates will mean that a greater portion of the federal budget will be consumed by servicing the debt. Between 2006 and 2017, the portion of federal outlays devoted to interest payments will grow from 8% to 14%. Moreover, the surplus income from social security is dwindling and will soon disappear as a source for paying other bills.

These developments imply greater contention in the future over how the federal government allocates its resources. Concerns about the size of the national debt will further feed this contention. In this light, a modestly cautious approach might be to:

1. Avoid steps in the near-term that imperil economic recovery,

2. "Economize" by ensuring that deficit dollars are used in ways most conducive to recovery and sustainable growth, and

3. Adjust spending priorities to ensure that federal expenditures closely correspond to the nation's most critical needs and shortfalls, current and emerging.

While privileging the goal of recovery, this approach requires that we revisit and toughen our calculation of national needs and priorities.


Does DoD Need More? Can Less Do?
A first, essential step in answering this question is understanding why DoD's stated "requirements" have ballooned by 100% in real (after inflation) terms since 1998. The most facile answer is that "America is at war and wars are expensive." But this explanation is not sufficient. Including the funding in the FY 2011 budget, the wars account for only half of the increase in DoD funding since 1998.

Moreover, the wars themselves have been exceptionally expensive in comparative terms - but why? Measured in 2010 dollars,

• The Korean conflict cost $393,000 per person/year invested;
• The Vietnam conflict cost $256,000; and
• The Iraq and Afghanistan commitments have cost $792,000 (through 2010).

Rather than adequately explain the post-1998 spending surge, the high cost of recent military operations adds to the mystery.


What is driving DoD costs upwards?
In our recent study, "An Undisciplined Defense, we discerned several reasons for the unprecedented increase in DoD's stated "requirements". The cost drivers that we identified also pertain to swollen war expenses. And all of these "drivers" point to policy options - choices - that might significantly reduce DoD expenditures.

First, there has been weak prioritization among the many military modernization programs undertaken since the end of the Cold War.

Too much of the $2.5 trillion that was invested in military research, development, and procurement between 1989 and 2002 was "backward looking", rooted in Cold War programs and concerns. As a result, the post-2001 wars required a new wave of modernization investment.

Also, many of the new technology programs pursued since 1989 - like Predator drones - were simply appended to existing modernization plans, rather than supplanting them. We call this phenomenon of poorly-integrated, over-lapping acquisition programs "discordant modernization."

Chart 5 shows the real rise in modernization spending between 1978 and 2010 figured on a per person basis - that is: total spending in 2010 dollars divided by the number of full-time military personnel. This is a way of taking into account the change in force size.  And what it shows is that recent spending per person is 150% greater in real terms than during the Reagan high-tide. And yet, DoD considers today's allocations to be inadequate.

Second, America's reliance on high-cost "volunteer" (professional) military labor, which began after (and as a reaction to) the Vietnam war experience, is ill-suited to the conduct of protracted, large-scale wars of occupation and counter-insurgency.

Put simply: labor-intensive slogs like those in Afghanistan and Iraq drive personnel costs sharply higher as DoD must pay more to recruit and retain personnel. Between 2001 and 2010, spending on military personnel rose by 50% in real terms, although the number of full-time military personnel grew by only slightly more than 2%. The fact is that America's post-Vietnam, post-Cold War military was not designed or built to sustain so many of its personnel in large-scale occupation and counter-insurgency duties for years on end. Of course, the authors' of the wars had not expected them to evolve into protracted slogs. Still, the 2010 US Quadrennial Defense Review seems to see more undertakings of this type in America's future.

Finally and most important: Following the collapse of Soviet power, successive US administrations have set more ambitious goals for the US armed forces. Essentially, as the magnitude of threats dwindled, national leadership pushed the security goal posts forward.

US leaders, Republican and Democratic alike, entered the post-Cold War period seeking both a "peace dividend" and a "power dividend". The first involved reducing the size of the US military and its budget. Chart 6 shows the change in full-time personnel strength during the 1978-2010 period in percentage terms (with the 1978 total of 2.062 million full-time personnel set equal to 100).

Power Dividend versus Peace Dividend
The "power dividend" that US leaders also sought involved requiring the US military to sustain and expand its continuous global presence, increase peacetime engagement activities, and prepare to conduct more types of missions, faster, across a greater portion of the earth. US post-Cold War strategies have looked beyond the traditional goals of defense and deterrence, aiming to use military power to actually prevent the emergence of threats and to "shape" the strategic environment. US defense planners also elevated the importance of lesser and hypothetical threats, thus requiring the military to prepare for many more, lower-probability contingencies.

The ambitions of post-Cold War US strategy and its vagueness were at odds with the desire to also reduce the military's size and budget. But the two thrusts were supposed to be reconciled by a series of reforms and innovations that would allow the armed forces "to do more with less." Reform efforts were to focus principally on trimming DoD infrastructure, streamlining support, renovating business practices, and privatizing various activities. Some leaders also saw in new information technologies the promise of a "revolution in military affairs" that would enable the armed forces to achieve greater integration and efficiency.

As it turns out, the reform agendas fell short of their promise. Institutional resistance and bureaucratic inertia proved stronger than the impetus for change. While reform advocates had hoped that their efforts might liberate between 10% and 15% of the Pentagon budget - or even more - actual savings have amounted to less than 5%.

Squeezed between the failure of reform efforts and the ambitions of post-Cold War military strategy, the peace dividend soon vanished and DoD's budget began its upward climb. This, combined with a "discordant" approach to acquisition and the conduct of labor-intensive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, produced the exceptionally high DoD budgets we see today.


Where Did the Money Go?
After 1998, the number of full-time military personnel did not rise by much (see previous chart), despite the wars. But the amount of money given to the Pentagon calculated in terms of dollars per full-time person in uniform soared. Chart 7 illustrates the change in DoD budget authority per full-time per person in uniform. The figure also shows the allocation of the DoD budget among appropriation categories - the main ones being Personnel, Operations and Maintenance (O&M), Procurement, Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E), and other smaller accounts. All budget numbers have been converted to 2010 dollars.

The upward trend in the DoD budget partly reflects decreased efficiency and a failure to make disciplined choices in procurement. It also reflects the decision to put the military to work in wars of a type for which it was not designed. Finally, it reflects increased readiness, activity, and capability. In some important respects, today's US military is more powerful than its Cold War predecessor, even though the number of full-time military personnel is 30% less. Among the enhancements are a vast increase in its capacity to attack targets with aircraft and missiles. Also, its capacity to rapidly deploy troops and equipment has improved. In these and other ways, the power of the Pentagon has been re-inflated. And, it is important to recognize, that DoD has taken steps to compensate for the post-Cold War reduction in the number of military personnel.

The Surge in Private Contractors
Since 1989, the pool of DoD military and civilian employees has shrunk by more than 30%. Nonetheless, the total DoD workforce - which includes private contractors - is today as large or larger than it was during the Cold War. The re-inflation of the Pentagon labor pool involves a dramatic expansion in the role of private contractors whose employees have assumed many of the support functions previously performed by DoD personnel. The number of workers on contract to the Pentagon has probably grown by 40% since 1989. This growth partly shows up in the budget numbers as a steep increase in the O&M account. Calculated in per person terms, O&M expenditures are 2.5 times higher today than in 1989. In absolute terms (and corrected for inflation), O&M spending has risen 76%.



The Surge in Military Construction
Military construction is one of the lesser DoD appropriation categories, having seldom accounted for more than 2% of the DoD budget during the past 60 years.  The past five years are an exception, however.  During 2006-2010, nearly $100 billion was set aside for construction. This makes for a yearly average during the recent period that is 2.5 times as great as the annual average for the preceding 15 years. There are a variety of reasons for the building surge, among them: construction in Iraq and Afghanistan; the realignment of US bases worldwide, including new construction in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Africa<; and, new facilities to accommodate an expanded Marine Corps and Army.
 

US Military Spending Primacy
The policy choices and failures outlined above have converged to give the United States a historically unique edge in military spending. As shown in Chart 8, the amount America currently spends seems entirely detached from others' efforts to build military power, whether allied or adversarial. The Chart shows the change in relative shares of military spending worldwide over the period 1989-2006.

• The United States has gone from accounting for only 28% of world spending during the Cold War to 41 % in 2006, and
• The Western group as a whole has gone from a 49% share to a 70% share, while,
• The group of potential adversary and competitor states has gone from claiming a 42 % share to just 16 % in 2006.

America's predominance in defense spending is not solely a product of post-9/11 initiatives, either. Throughout most of the 1990s, the United States claimed 31% - 33% of world military expenditures while potential adversary states in aggregate claimed 18-20 percent. Had Ronald Reagan - who is generally regarded a hawkish president - wanted to achieve in the 1980s the ratio between US and adversary spending that existed in 2006, he would have had to quadruple his defense budgets. And, of course, since 2006, the US defense budget has not receded, but instead grown by another 20% in real terms. By 2011, the United States will probably account for more than half of all global military spending calculated in terms of "purchasing power parity" (which corrects for differences between national economies).


Trillions to Burn? The US edge in spending has not purchased clear and sure progress toward a more secure and stable world. Nor has it produced an especially efficient military - one closely adapted to the current security environment. The road not taken during the past decade - at a cost of some trillions of dollars - would have involved some combination of:

1. A more forceful and thorough-going approach to Pentagon reform,

2. An integrated or "joint" service approach to force modernization that also closely tailored the acquisition of equipment to new era conditions, and

3. Greater restraint and greater specificity in setting post-Cold War military goals and missions.

That this has not occurred suggests a lapse in attention to the strategic costs and benefits associated with our chosen defense posture. It is as though the nation has trillions of dollars to burn.

Can defense spending be rolled-back? A key enabling condition for the types of problems identified above is the "permissive spending environment" that insulates the Pentagon budget. At present, both Democratic and Republican leaders seem disinclined - each for their own reasons - to rethink the ways America uses its military or to press for the type of budget constraints that might prompt reform. Put simply, there seems to be little political gain (and much political risk) in stumping for DoD budget restraint. But emerging fiscal realities may soon compel increased attention to how the nation allocates its resources among competing goals - foreign and domestic, military and non-military. And this might put the nation on the road to a more disciplined defense.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
An Undisciplined Defense:  Understanding the $2 Trillion Surge in US Defense Spending, PDA Briefing Report #20, 18 January 2010. Print copies are available for $11 ($16 to overseas addresses) by check or money order to Commonwealth Institute at POB 398105, Cambridge MA 02139 On request one copy will sent free to non-profit libraries.

 The President's Dilemma:  Debt, Deficits, and Defense Spending, PDA Briefing Memo #45, 18 January 2010.

 Forceful Engagement: Rethinking the Role of Military Power in US Global Policy, PDA Briefing Report 19, December 2008

Re-Envisioning Defense: An Agenda for US Policy Debate & Transition, PDA Briefing Memo #44, December 2008.

Toward a Sustainable US Defense Posture: An Option to save $60+ Billion Over the Next Five Years, PDA Briefing Memo #42, 02 August 2007.

DATA SOURCES

Chart 1. DoD Budget Authority with and without contingency operations
US Department of Defense (DoD), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2010 (Washington DC: US DoD, June 2009), Table 6-8 DoD BA by Appropriation Title, FY 1948 to FY 2010;

US DoD, FY 2010 Budget Request Summary Justification (Washington DC: US Department of Defense, May 2009), Figure 1.1 Historical DoD Funding, p. 1-6.

US Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year 2010 (Washington: GPO, May 2009), Table 26-1 Budget Authority and Outlays by Function, Category, and Program; and

Nina M. Serafino, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, may 2006).

Chart 2. DoD Budget Authority 1948-2019. See sources for Chart 1.

Chart 3. Gross Federal Debt as % GDP, 1940-2019
OMB, Mid-Session Review, Budget of the US Government, Fiscal Year 2010 (Washington DC: GPO, August 2009), Table S-15. Federal Government Financing and Debt;

US OMB, Historical Tables, US Budget Fiscal Year 2010 (Washington: GPO, 2009), Table 1.1 Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits 1789-2014; Table 1.2 Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits as Percentages of GDP 1930-2014; Table 1.3 Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits in Current Dollars, Constant Dollars, and as Percentages of GDP 1940-2014.

Chart 4. US Federal Budget Surplus/Deficit as % of GDP 1946-2019. See sources for Chart 3.

Chart 5. DoD Per Person Budget Authority for Modernization 1978-2010.
 National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2010 (Washington DC: US DoD, June 2009), Table 6-8 Budget Authority by Appropriation Title FY 1948-FY 2010, Table 7-5 DoD Manpower FY 1940 to FY 2010.

For 2009 and 2010 data see: US DoD, Budget Amendment to the FY 2010 President's Budget Request for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Summary and Explanation of Changes (Washington DC: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense Comptroller, August 2009), pp. 6-9;

US DoD, FY 2010 Budget Request Summary Justification< (Washington DC: US DoD, May 2009), p. 1-9;

Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 2010 (Washington DC: GPO, May 2009), Table 26-1 Budget Authority and Outlays by Function, Category, and Program.

Chart 6. US Military Full-Time Personnel 1978-2010.

US DoD, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2010 (Washington DC: US DoD, June 2009), Table 7-5 DoD Manpower FY 1940 to FY 2010.

 Chart 7.Figure 5. DoD Per Person BA by Appropriation Title 1978-2010. See sources for Chart 1 and also:

US DoD, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2010 (Washington DC US DoD, June 2009), Table 7-5 DoD Manpower - FY 1940 to FY 2010.

Chart 8. Trends in Military Construction 1951-2010.
US DoD, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2010 (Washington DC: US DoD, June 2009), Table 6-8 DoD BA by Appropriation Title FY 1948 to FY 2010;

OMB, Historical Tables, Budget of the US Government, Fiscal Year 2010 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), Table 5.1 Budget Authority by Function and Subfunction 1976-2014; and,

Daniel Else, et. al., Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies: FY 2009 Appropriations; -FY 2008 Appropriations(Washington DC: CRS, February 2009, February 2008).

Chart 9. World Military Spending Shares 1986-2006
Chart 9 counts as US allies all NATO states plus Israel, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea. The category of "potential adversary and competitor states" includes, for 1986: the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty states, China, Cuba, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Vietnam. For 1994, it includes the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Treaty states are replaced by and Belarus is removed from this category. In 2006, Libya is also removed, but Venezuela is added. Sources: US ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1995, 1999-2000 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996; 2001); and, International Institute for Strategic Studies,The Military Balance 1996/97, 1995/96, 1994/95, 1993/94, 1992/93, 2002-2003, 2008 (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2008; London: Oxford University Press, 2002, 1996-1995; London: Brassey's, 1992-1994).

Inflation estimates
US OMB, Mid-session Review, US Budget Fiscal Year 2010 (Washington DC: GPO, August 2009), Table 3. Comparison of Economic Assumptions;

US OMB, Historical Tables, US Budget Fiscal Year 2010 (Washington DC: GPO, May 2009), Table 10.1 Gross Domestic Product and Deflators Used in the Historical Tables: 1940-2014; and,

 National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2010, Table 5-6 DoD Deflators, BA by Appropriation Title. Collapse

These are among the findings of two 18 January reports on the dynamics of recent defense spending from the Project on Defense Alternatives, a small think tank with offices in the Washington area and Cambridge, Massachusetts.

According to the reports, the boost in spending after 1998 is unmatched over a nearly 60-year period, edging out both the Reagan and the Kennedy-Johnson spending hikes. And the Obama administration, in a move likely to confound critics and supporters alike, plans to spend more on the Pentagon than any administration since 1948.

"The recent wars are only half the story," says author Carl Conetta, "And their high price tag raises as many questions as it answers." The report finds the recent wars to have cost $792,000 per deployed person per year, while the Vietnam war cost only $256,000 per person per year in today's dollars.

Part of the reason for the relatively higher cost of current wars is that the United States today relies on an expensive professional military, rather than a conscript one. The cost-structure of today's military is not well-suited to protracted, labor-intensive wars, concludes the report. Related to this, the proportion of private contractors used in today's wars is five times higher than during the Vietnam war. Also adding to costs, DoD equipment purchases in the decade before the wars focused too heavily on the legacy systems favored by the services and on long-range strike weapons. So a new round of buying was needed to support counter-insurgency operations.

The reports find that DoD has been generally lax in setting priorities among contending acquisition programs. But the most serious problem cited in the studies was the adoption of ambitious new roles, missions, and strategies for a reduced military after the Cold War ended. A variety of reform and transformation efforts were supposed to make it possible for a smaller military to do more. But these efforts fell short of their promise. So costs rose with ambitions.

Since the mid-1990s, the Pentagon has turned increasingly to private contractors to help fill the gap between ambitious strategies and the available number of military personnel. The report finds that the Pentagon's contractor workforce has probably grown by 40% since 1989, while the numbers of military personnel and civilian DoD employees have declined by more than 30%.

To avoid today's exceptionally high budgets the reports suggest that national authorities would have to be more realistic in setting military missions and goals, more judicious in decisions about going to war, more forceful in pushing for Pentagon reform, and stricter in setting and enforcing budget priorities. There is a deeper political problem, warns Conetta: "At present, civilian leaders are politically disinclined to push the Pentagon hard or enact tighter budget constraints, and this stance undercuts reform." In reviewing the economic landscape, however, the reports do conclude that fiscal realities may soon prompt a change in attitudes.

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What matters most are the lessons that the new administration gleans from the failed efforts of its predecessors. The first among these is perhaps the most difficult to fully grasp and take to heart: The United States has been using its armed forces and military power well beyond the limit of their utility. We are now experiencing not just diminishing returns, but negative ones. Thus, the nation finds itself paying more and more for less and less security.

The military effort expended these past eight years has been, by any measure, prodigious. But, in no area of concern has it produced much in the way of reliable progress. Indeed, the world seems less stable and more polarized today than it did in 2001. And anti-Americanism is at a level not seen since the Vietnam war years.

The Iraq and Afghanistan operations have demonstrated that the world's "sole superpower" cannot -- by its current methods -- reliably stabilize two destitute and dejected nations comprising only one percent of the world's population, despite the investment of nearly 5,000 American lives and more than $850 billion. What General David Petraeus once asked of the Iraq war -- "Tell me how this ends" -- still pertains, despite the reduction in violence there. The same question might be asked of the Afghanistan war and, indeed, of the "war on terror" as a whole, which seems to be on a road to nowhere.

Setting a new course in policy begins with acknowledging that America's recent emphasis on military action and instruments has been, on balance, counter-productive. Looking to the future, the next administration must be more realistic about what can be reliably accomplished by these means. This applies not only to counter-terrorism efforts, but also to efforts to stabilize troubled regions of the world and prevent the emergence of new threats.

It has become something of a mantra among reformers that the United States needs to "re-balance" its security "tool kit". But it is not enough to simply "plus up" the diplomatic side of engagement. Rolling back the current emphasis on military action and instruments is a prerequisite to greater success in diplomatic efforts. This, because what most divides the United States from those it proposes to lead is the issue of when, how, and how much to use force and the armed forces.

More generally, the next Administration needs to lead the nation in reappraising its defense posture and investments. Despite the expenditure of more than $7 trillion since 1992, and more than ten years of talk about "military transformation", America's armed forces are not yet especially well-adapted to the new security environment. Efforts to prepare and defend in all directions have dissipated American power and have left the nation less prepared to deal with what is actually emerging. Presently, the United States is responsible for nearly half of all military spending worldwide. And yet, our present and future Secretary of Defense argues that this is simply not enough -- which should lead all of us to suspect that either our resources are being misspent or our objectives misconceived.

Achieving real change in US security policy will not be easy. Our present posture and preferences are well rooted ideologically, institutionally, and politically. Nonetheless, the experiences of the past eight years (and more) provide a powerful argument for a sea-change in policy. For now, a minimum goal is that the inauguration of Barack Obama as the 44th President of the United States should mark the renewal of the national debate on security policy and not its end.

Links to Companion Pieces
Forceful Engagement: Rethinking the Role of Military Power in US Global Policy

Re-Envisioning Defense: An Agenda for US Policy Debate and Transition

Suggestions for a New Defense Strategy for Obama. (Wolf)

Accompanying Charts

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On June 28, 2008, I published the summary of Re-Envisioning Defense Alternatives by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight. On June 7, the report received some positive corporate media attention with an editorial in the NY Times "Where Do We Go From Here?.

In a correspondence from Carl Conetta, I learned that the report has been downloaded more than 10,000 times, and is being circulated to members of Congress with a cover letter by Rep. Jim
McGovern. Carl and Charles have also been invited to debate alternative Iraq policies at the US Institute for Peace. It is great that such worthy work is getting serious attention.

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Recent defense policy evinces a disturbing paradox: it has been delivering less and
less security at ever increasing cost. And, on a world scale, a process of global re-
polarization and re-militarization is underway. If unchecked, this portends a return to
conditions reminiscent of the Cold War, which would add impetus to weapon
proliferation, arms races, and conflicts.

Reviewing current US policy, we have identified 25 concerns or areas of concern that
relate to the problems noted above. These might form an agenda for policy
discussion and reform. From these we have distilled a "short list" of three overarching
topics or concerns that, taken together, capture the fundamental problems in current
policy. Alternatives addressing these three core concerns can provide guidance for
understanding and addressing the rest.

THREE CORE CONCERNS

Core concern 1. Security policy vision: How do we understand and hope to attain
security?

This entails our assessment of the security environment and its dynamics as well as
our security interests, goals, concerns, and strategy. Presently, the "war on
terrorism" provides the principal organizing theme for US security policy, which puts
America on a permanent war footing. Is this the optimal frame for addressing
post-Cold War security challenges?

An alternative approach might emphasize non-military means and broad multilateral
cooperation in mitigating and redressing the sources of stress and instability in the
international system. Such an approach would not turn principally on waging and
winning wars or pursuing strategic advantage in a contest of nation-states. Instead,
it would turn on building broad cooperation and winning the confidence of people in
troubled regions. Focal concerns might include water, food, energy, and health
security, global warming, economic development, and the management of
globalization.

Core concern 2. The role of force and the armed forces in US foreign and security
policy.

Since the Cold War's end, the role of the US military in the world, and the role of force
in US policy, have grown more prominent. The outcome of this increased activity has
not been encouraging, however. It has done more to add to instability than resolve it.
And it has proved fabulously expensive in terms of both lives and treasure. Any
adequate alternative to recent defense policy must provide new guidance on the use
of force and the role of the military.

Core concern 3. The "fit" between America's defense posture and the global security
environment.

America's military posture is not well-adapted to today's security challenges. And
this contributes to its problem of sustainability. Adjusting the nation's defense
posture to more closely fit the security environment would simultaneously render that
posture more "sustainable". And this might turn the defense policy paradox "on its
head" yielding greater security at lower cost.

TOPICS FOR POLICY DEBATE AND REFORM

The 25 areas of concern that we have identified in US policy are listed below. They
can be divided into eight categories:

* Policy on strategic warfare
* Counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism, and homeland security
* Policy on major military operations, conventional and irregular
* Peacetime military engagement
* The US stance on international law and arms control
* Civil-military relations: The growing influence of the Pentagon
* Defense budget, acquisition, and management issues
* Country-specific controversies

>> POLICY ON STRATEGIC WARFARE

1. Nuclear weapons modernization, missile defense, and the "new (offensive)
deterrence"
2. Prompt global strike: The advent of conventional strategic warfare
3. Seizing the "new high ground": the weaponization of space

>> COUNTER-PROLIFERATION, COUNTER-TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND
SECURITY

4. Offensive counter-proliferation (OCP): Arms control by bombardment?
5. Counter-terrorism & homeland security: Search for a sensible strategy

>> MAJOR REGIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS, CONVENTIONAL AND
IRREGULAR

6. Preparations for major wars reflect unnecessarily ambitious goals
7. "Shock and awe" strategy and attacks on civilian-military targets
8. Counter-insurgency, peace and stability operations, nation-building: renewed
enthusiasm despite Iraq experience.

>> PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

9. Global military presence & base posture: cover the earth?
10. Military cooperation, assistance, and arms transfers programs: uncertain effects.

>> US STANCE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMS CONTROL

11. Adherence to international law and legal institutions
12. The role of negotiated arms control in US security policy

>> CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF THE
PENTAGON

13. DOD's domestic "perception management" efforts
14. DOD's drive for expanded "authorities" and greater freedom of action

>> DEFENSE BUDGET AND ACQUISITION ISSUES

15. DOD's broken financial and inventory accounting system.
16. Pork-barrel spending: the Pentagon budget as "gravy train"
17. DOD's broken weapon procurement system
18. Military transformation: To what end? How much of what is enough?
19. Setting the defense budget forever more than $600 billion?

>> COUNTRY-SPECIFIC ISSUES

20. Iraq withdrawal: soon or never?
21. Resolving the Iran and North Korea nuclear issues
22. Afghanistan war & Pakistan instability
23. Israel-Palestine and Lebanon conflict
24. Relations with China and Russia.
25. Increased military activity in sub-Saharan Africa and South America

Go to Full Text of the report

For a related discussion see Out from the House of War: A Litmus for New Leadership in Security Policy, also by Carl Connetta and pertinent in the presidential election year.

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INDEX

The advent of primacy A troubled hegemony Primacy - what is it good for? Another countervailing factor: domestic dissent Peace operations versus warfighting Here and there: the contours of US globalism From Clinton to Bush: continuity and change From failure to empire? Boots on the ground Second thoughts on the utility of force Notes

What's the point of having this superb military...if we can't use it?

- former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, 1993,
as quoted by Colin Powell in My American Journey.¹ 

The fundamental question that continues to confront American foreign policy is what to do with a surplus of power and the many and considerable advantages this surplus confers on the United States.

- Richard Haass, November 2000.² 

What changed on 9/11 were the political conditions - mostly domestic - weighing on US policymakers. After that day, most Americans saw the post-Cold War world and America's place in it differently. This change in popular perspectives and expectations enabled a change in US policy which, in turn, is now gradually altering the geostrategic environment. What was lacking before 9/11 was an integrative policy framework around which a broad, public consensus favoring military activism might form. Today, the "war on terror" is that framework. The follow-on concept of a "long war" against Islamic radicalism serves a similar function. Neither framework, however, accurately models the current security environment and neither illuminates a sensible, sustainable approach to improving US and global security. If anything, present policy has set the United States on a course of diminishing security at increasing cost.

The most obvious changes in policy practice have been a 78 percent real increase in defense expenditures since 1998 and a dramatic surge in US military activity abroad. US spending on national defense and war is now about $650 billion (FY 2008) per annum, which constitutes 50 percent of the world total. In real terms, the United States has not spent so much in any year since 1946. As for military activity: The current (2007) number of US armed forces personnel deployed in crisis operations abroad exceeds 200,000. This is almost 300 percent of the average level of crisis deployments during the years 1989-2001, measured in terms of the numbers of people deployed and the duration of their deployment. Notably, the baseline period encompasses the first Gulf War. As of 1 November 2007, more than 4,300 US military personnel have died in operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom - which is 10 times the number of deaths in major operations during the period 1989-2001.

The outcome of America's post-9/11 surge in military spending and activity is a testament to the limits on the utility of war and other coercive means. Unintended, unanticipated, and chaotic consequences have predominated. The principal missions - operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom - have run aground, spreading not democracy but instability throughout several regions. America's military campaigning has seriously weakened its standing in the world, pushed Muslim populations toward Islamist politics, and helped energize and unify the most radical Islamist elements. While unsettling America's alliances, this activism has accelerated "balancing behavior" on the part of potential "big power" competitors: China and Russia. Together they have built out the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes as full members China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. (Observer status has been afforded to India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan.)

A key indicator of the success of current policy is progress in counter-terrorism efforts. On a global scale, terrorist activity and violence has grown worse, not better since 11 September 2001. Average levels of terrorist violence that would have been considered extreme in the period prior to 9/11 have become the norm in the years since. And there is no sign that this trend is abating. An analysis of the Rand Corporation database on terrorist activity shows monthly fatalities due to terrorism to have increased by 150 percent, on average. ³  Terrorist incidents have increased in frequency by 167 percent. A fair portion of the increased activity has occurred in Iraq - but not all. Removing Iraq from the picture shows an increase in the average monthly rate of terrorism fatalities of more than 10 percent. The increase in the rate of incidents not counting Iraq is 75 percent. Notably, the baseline period - the 44.5 months preceding 11 September 2001 - includes the fatalities of that day.

Despite this negative balance sheet, the "war on terror" framework will likely survive the Bush administration, as will essential elements of the "long war" formulation (although not the phrase). As of late 2007, it also seems likely that American troops will remain deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan for years to come - if not decades. None of the leading US presidential candidates are willing to propose a short time line for troop withdrawal from Iraq. And complete military withdrawal, as distinct from partial, is not a part of any leading candidate's platform. At a more general level: US security policy will continue to give pride of place to military and other coercive instruments. One might expect the negative outcomes and high costs of post-9/11 military activism to spur a more substantial shift. Understanding the impediments to change requires a look at the longer-term challenges faced by the United States in the post-Cold War period.

The advent of primacy

The collapse of the Warsaw pact and Soviet Union affected America's global prospects in two, contradictory ways - one seeming to increase the latitude for applying military power in the pursuit of national goals, the other diminishing it.

The first effect of Soviet collapse was to propel the United States to a position of historically unparalleled military primacy. Suggestive of the change, America's share of worldwide defense spending jumped from 28 percent to 34 percent (comparing 1986 and 1994 budgets). ⁴  Although in absolute terms, US military expenditures actually declined (for a while), the elevation in America's relative standing was profound. It was as though the nation had increased its military spending by 50 percent vis à vis the rest of the world, virtually overnight. The change was even more profound with regard to the set of potential threat and competitor states - China, Russia, and a few others. Relative to these, it was as though America had increased spending by 260 percent. The United States now loomed like a colossus over its potential foes and competitors.

The change affected not only the balance in standing military forces, but also in command of the arms trade and in capacities for military assistance, global military presence, and military research and development. Notably, these margins have grown larger since the mid-1990s, despite increased spending by Russia and China. In 2006, the United States accounted for more than 50 percent of world military spending.

The advent of clear US military predominance prompted a decade-long discussion among US state managers and defense experts on the implications of a putatively "unipolar" world. What seemed clear was that the United States had gained additional leverage with which to buttress its leadership position and to pursue national objectives more vigorously and on a broader scale. Characteristically, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright asserted during her 1997 confirmation hearings that "We must be more than audience, more even than actors, we must be the authors of the history of our age." Similarly, President Bush, proclaimed in his 2006 State of the Union address that "we accept the call of history to deliver the oppressed and move this world toward peace."

The advent of clear US military predominance prompted a decade-long discussion among US state managers and defense experts on the implications of a putatively "unipolar" world. What seemed clear was that the United States had gained additional leverage with which to buttress its leadership position and to pursue national objectives more vigorously and on a broader scale. Characteristically, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright asserted during her 1997 confirmation hearings that "We must be more than audience, more even than actors, we must be the authors of the history of our age." Similarly, President Bush, proclaimed in his 2006 State of the Union address that "we accept the call of history to deliver the oppressed and move this world toward peace."

Evident in such statements is what might be called a "hegemonic presumption" - a claim to exceptional leadership prerogatives. Among its axioms is the idea that superior power conveys both a special responsibility to act - unilaterally, if need be - and a unique capacity to act responsibly. And this extends to the prerogative to use force. Thus, in 1998, when the episodic bombing of Iraq became more intensive and routine, Secretary Albright argued that the United States could initiate such action because, as a superpower, it stood taller and could see further into the future than others could. "We see the danger here to all of us", she said.⁵  Albright also repeated President Clinton's earlier designation of the United States as "the indispensable nation", meaning that it must assume the responsibility to do what only it can.

While Clinton and Albright offered functional justifications for the US arrogation of authority, President Bush has seemed to prefer metaphysical ones - variously evoking History (as above) or God as the source of its authority. Either way, what these statements construe as a diligent embrace of responsibility is actually an assertion of power - one that only optionally submits to external constraints.

That the United States should presume to speak and act as a hegemon is nothing new. Indeed, what has characterized US global engagement for nearly seven decades is America's unique position of authority within an exclusive community of nations and its distinctive emphasis on the role of military power in foreign policy.

A troubled hegemony

Since the Second World War the United States has enjoyed a hegemonic position within the "western" camp. By this we mean that it has enjoyed a predominant position among this group of states, especially in the economic and military fields - and that this position is partly institutionalized. Hegemony is a hierarchal, rule-governed system in which one polity enjoys predominant influence in defining the rules, adjudicating them, and enforcing them.⁶  America's position is not unlike the position of Athens in the Delian League as described by Isocrates (circa 300 BC); its hegemony is "the right of leadership conceded to one state by the others." ⁷ 

Hegemony depends on the acquiescence of the junior partners and on their expectation that deference to the hegemon will yield greater absolute gains. America's hegemonic position among the "western" states does not depend on coercion; nor is the subordination of the junior partners complete. The terms and price of the relationship are always at issue - as are individual policies. But the United States can apply substantial leverage to get its way by financial means, or by threatening to withdraw from cooperative enterprises, or by threatening to "act on its own" as it sees fit (with system-wide effects). The hegemon disciplines its partners by reminding them that it is always best to bandwagon with it, the "indispensable nation". Of course, the partners must be convinced of real, positive benefits in terms of security, stability, legitimacy, and growth.

In recent decades, US hegemony has been increasingly troubled. The American predilection for employing "decisive" and other coercive means often has been a point of contention with its partners - especially since the mid-1960s. More significantly: since the early 1970s, partners have increasingly viewed the United States as unwilling to pay the economic price of hegemonic privilege. And this perception has grown as globalization has accelerated and international economic competition has intensified. Still, for many years, the presence of two million Warsaw Pact troops within easy striking distance of the western European heartland helped guarantee America's position and its preferences within the alliance. To put it simply: the "Soviet threat" cemented American hegemony within the Western group.

Primacy - what is it good for?

Against the background of a troubled and contested hegemony, we can understand the second effect of Soviet collapse on America's global prospects. With the disappearance of the Soviet camp, the strongest inducement for European deference to American leadership evaporated. More generally, the relevance of the asset that America now held in incomparable abundance - military power - seemed diminished. With Soviet collapse, America won a windfall in a currency of power that - because of Soviet collapse - was simultaneously devalued. Post-cold war instability (such as civil conflict in the Balkans) was not been sufficient to bring the allies back around to acquiescing to American ways and means as a matter of course. Already by the late-1990s, a surge in anti-Americanism was evident.

During the 1990s and since, every US military involvement and initiative has entailed significant contention between the United States and key European allies. In this, Robert Kagan has seen a parting of ways between the United States and its long-time allies in "Old Europe." He detects a difference "on the all-important question of power - the utility of power, the morality of power..." ⁸  The power at issue is military, specifically. And its use (or the threat of using it) is what most divides us from those we propose to lead. But the dispute is not purely a philosophical one. It is grounded in different assessments of the risks and putative gains that attach to war and its alternatives.

During the 20th century, Europe has suffered 40 times as many warfare deaths per capita as has the United States. Its greatest calamities in living memory - fascism and communism - are the effluent of war. Behind these is the experience of centuries of bloody ideological division. And, during the long night of the cold war, no Europeans could doubt that any serious East-West clash would utterly devastate their homelands. Partly as a result of these circumstances, Europe has made considerable progress in forging cooperative relations among its 46 nations, which together constitute one-quarter of the earth's total. This certainly contributes to a different vision of how to deal with instability and threat. And it seems that popular opinion in other war-torn and divided regions - the Mideast, Persian Gulf, Africa - tends to favor the European view.

Another countervailing factor: domestic dissent

The disappearance of the Soviet threat also made it difficult to form a stable US domestic consensus on overseas military activism. During the 1990s, almost every contingency operation - Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Kosovo - quickly became a point of acute contention. Outside the context of the global East-West struggle, America's security stakes in many far-flung conflicts seemed attenuated. Neither the notion of "humanitarian interests" nor that of "important if not
vital interests" were sufficient to quell dissent. Of course, as noted above, the events of 11 September 2001 eventually gave rise to a more effective framework for foreign military action.

During the 1990s, the domestic US debate on operations abroad reflected more than different notions of national interest. Also at issue were the ways in which national authorities proposed to use American armed forces. Dissent (including by military leaders) focused, first, on the employment of US units under foreign (or United Nations) command - or otherwise outside US command and control structures. Similarly contentious was the expanded use of US forces in "peace and stability operations" - as opposed to warfighting and traditional deterrence tasks. Of course, these objections ran directly counter to allied (and global) preferences, which favored truly multilateral arrangements (ideally under UN command) and restrictive uses of armed forces (that is: peace operations, not war).

Peace operations versus warfighting

The domestic US debate regarding peace operations and the differences in the US and allied practices of these can provide a guide of sorts to the range of leading opinion on the appropriate uses of force in the post-Cold War era.

What distinguishes "warfighting" from "peace and stability operations" (PSOs) is the former's focus on destroying or disabling an enemy's military and establishing a monopoly on force for one's own units within an area of interest. Characteristically, the warfighting paradigm parses the world into friends and enemies. It prescribes disempowering the enemy and making it subject to one's own will. By contrast, PSOs involve facilitating or enforcing a restricted mandate - which itself rests on a broad multilateral consensus (including the partial consent or acquiescence of the parties subject to control). The executive agent of a PSO polices violations of the mandate, but does not typically identify a particular party as a strategic enemy. PSOs may include combat operations of a limited type - for instance: self-defense, convoy protection, or protection of a threatened enclave. But these are usually episodic, reactive, tactical, and governed by restrictive rules of engagement.

Peace operations depend on strong international consensus and the interplay of compellence and assent to achieve desired objectives - an approach meant to minimize the destruction and chaos associated with war. Thus, PSOs are bound to be arduous and knotty. They can seldom promise quick, decisive results. European and other allied interest in them reflects acute concern about the relative costs of the alternative - war - and also reflects optimism about the power and prospects of broad multilateral action.

Even while the Clinton administration's interest in PSOs earned it the disapprobation of warfighting enthusiasts at home, the US practice of PSOs usually diverged significantly from that favored by allied powers. In American practice, PSOs tended to creep toward war or, at least, major combat. If we imagine a spectrum of force ranging from minimal to maximal, allied preferences tended toward the minimal, warfighters tended toward the maximal, and the Clinton administration fell somewhere in between - to no one's satisfaction. This was true not only in PSOs, but also in multinational combat operations. While warfighting enthusiasts bemoaned the Clinton administration's "pin-prick" applications of force - in Serbia and Iraq, for instance - allied opinion railed against the American proclivity to quickly bring air, missile, and artillery firepower into play.

Here and there: the contours of US globalism

We can date the contemporary practice of US globalism to the declaration of war with Germany on 11 December 1941, although American involvement in the First World War was a precursor. In the decades since 1941, we can discern a set of preferences that together define an "equilibrium point" for US diplomatic and military activism abroad. Stray too far from these and the domestic political consensus begins to fray. (Here we are concerned not simply with "public opinion", but with organized, effective, or enabled opinion.)

• First, the national security stakes in foreign involvements must be perceived as real, present, and substantial;
• Second, the United States must retain freedom of action abroad. In alliance or other multinational endeavors, it must possess a distinct leadership role; and,
• Third, the modes of action must be perceived as "decisive" - that is: perceived as likely to yield clear, positive results. In diplomacy, this implies a preference for "hard line" positions and a forceful stance - a "no nonsense" brand of diplomacy. In military operations, it implies the demand for clear, invariant objectives and for using overwhelming force to win them quickly.

These attributes define a type of internationalism suited to a nation with deep-seated "exceptionalist" and "isolationist" sentiments. Americans' sense of "separateness" even in the course of engagement is well expressed in George M. Cohen's immensely popular World War One mobilization song, Over There (1917).⁹ 

Over there, over there/ Send the word, send the word over there/ That the Yanks are coming.../ Send the word, send the word to beware/ We'll be over, we're coming over/ And we won't come back till it's over/ Over there.

Cohen's lyrics focus on the act of going "over there" and give the impression that the "Yanks" carry with them a decisive solution to Europe's troubles. It is an internationalism that not only maintains, but hinges on maintaining the distinction between "here" and "there". The song implies an "us and them" that is not the Entente and Central powers so much as it is the United States and Europe - "here" and "there."

Cohen's song also reminds us that American internationalism always has been war-driven - in 1917, 1941, and 1950 (with peacetime engagement thereafter framed continuously in terms of the Cold War). One of the factors complicating US military activism during the 1990s was the absence of an overarching wartime framework, which pertains to the first and third preferences noted above.

From Clinton to Bush: continuity and change

The Clinton and Bush administrations were in accord on advancing a new post-Cold War "rule set" to govern international relations - especially with regard to the proliferation of advanced weapons, missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and nuclear technology. Both agreed that a set of US-defined "rogue states" had to be generally proscribed and pressured to transform by a variety of means, including forceful ones. The two also agreed that history had proved market democracy to be the best way to organize human society - and that its spread was essential to the long-term security of the United States. Enlargement of the community of market democracies, and not simply containment of America's adversaries, was a shared objective. Finally, the two agreed that military primacy and America's new status as sole superpower gave it the responsibility, opportunity, and means to act more proactively and more forcefully in compelling progress.

The Clinton administration placed greater trust in globalization as a motor of positive change. US military initiatives might serve to police the process on its edges, curbing weapon proliferation, blunting the depredations of rogue states, and managing the most dangerous instances of instability. In addition: discrete and limited applications of force might hurry along the demise of rogue regimes. With regard to most of its initiatives, the administration was able to pull allied leaders along, although it often found itself pushing hard at the edges of consensus. Global public opinion was less availing, especially as the number of US bombing campaigns and operations grew. Least availing was US public and elite opinion, as noted above.

From its inauguration, the Bush administration was less sanguine or patient about globalization as an independent motor of change. The advance of market democracy would need more energetic assistance. And, obviously, it felt less constrained by the requirements of allied consensus, which it thought would eventually bandwagon with American victories. With regard to the orientation of America's armed forces, its principal policy innovations were to restore the emphasis on traditional warfighting and warfighting capabilities, beginning with the September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

The Bush administration also brought maximum war objectives to the fore, as a matter of doctrine. The goals of American wars, according to the 2001 QDR, would include not only "decisive victory" on the battlefield, but also possibly "changing the regime of an adversary state" and occupying "foreign territory until U.S. strategic objectives are met." (QDR-01, p. 13.) Further, the Bush administration significantly widened the scope for pre-emptive and "preventive" uses of force against terrorists, state-sponsors of terror, and adversary states attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction or their means of development or delivery. The so-called "Bush Doctrine", codified in the 2002 National Security Strategy, states that "America will act against...emerging threats before they are fully formed."

The Bush administration's re-emphasis on warfighting (in contrast to "operations other than war") spoke to dissent in the armed services and to broad conservative opinion. The idea of putting the option of "regime change" on the military menu also had demonstrable support - in Congress, at least. Neither proposition necessarily implied fighting more wars, however. And, indeed, candidate Bush had given the impression that, under his watch, the United States would be less interventionary than during the Clinton years and would avoid "missions without end." ¹⁰ 

What made a more energetic and proactive interventionary policy broadly acceptable within the United States was the 9/11 attacks - together with the initial impression that the US armed forces would be used in ways best suited to their capabilities. What has proved far less acceptable - and, indeed, has been the Bush administration's undoing - is the desultory occupation duties that followed the initial, conventional victories in Afghanistan and Iraq.

What the next US administration can learn from this is that the "war on terrorism" framework, together with popular fears about the spread of weapons of mass destruction, can enable greater military activism, but only of a certain type: fast and decisive. An entirely different matter are protracted campaigns of occupation and those that either seem detached from clear security threats or seem to diverge from the warfghting model. It is disconcerting, then, that the American policy "center" seems to be trending away from a recognition of this lesson. Instead, it is gravitating to a putative midpoint between the Clinton and Bush administration positions. Emblematic of this is the view that sees America's troubles in Afghanistan and Iraq as largely a matter of execution and insufficient troop strength, that foresees our occupation of those nations continuing for decades, and that pins its hopes for success on the enlargement of US ground forces and the renovation of counter-insurgency doctrine.

From failure to empire?

Complementing the official discourse on US global leadership has been one conducted in the broader US foreign policy community that more frankly promotes notions of US hegemony - and even empire. ¹¹  While America's hegemonic position within the western group is a matter of fact (as noted above), it has not usually been a subject of mainstream US political or diplomatic discourse. The advocates of an imperial turn in US policy seek to publicly affirm America's hegemonic role and extend it.

The ruminations about a new "liberal imperialism" began on the fringes of policy discourse in the mid-1990s, gathered steam around the turn of the millennium, and became quite commonplace after 9/11. Richard Haass, current president of the Council on Foreign Relations, was an "early adopter". In 2000, he wrote that, for the United States to succeed at its objective of global preeminence, it would be necessary for Americans to "re-conceive their role from a traditional nation-state to an imperial power." ¹² 

What the "new imperialists" prescribe is not an explicitly exploitative or extractive enterprise. Rather they see US hegemony as the best or only guarantor of a relatively peaceful global system and the most reliable agent for the stable advance of market democracy. According to Haass, the effort would entail America enacting "a foreign policy that attempts to organize the world along certain principles affecting relations between states and conditions within them" - a new rule set. ¹³ 

The sphere of Pax Americana would expand by a process of integration involving, to varying extents, the direct management of key unstable areas and some failed or failing states. There is an "inside" and an "outside" to the schema - or in Thomas Barnett's rendering, a "core" and a "gap". ¹⁴  The former comprises the hegemon and its partners; the latter, those states and areas subject to compulsion, control, or management. Thus, at its outer edges, the expanding sphere of hegemonic peace takes on a distinctly imperial aspect.

The idea that establishing or extending hegemony might serve as a path to peace is not a new one, of course Both Thucydides and Immanuel Kant examined (and rejected) it. Indeed, Thucydides sees in Athens' efforts to extend its hegemony the source of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC). Kant's description of the idea is incisive: "Every state, or its ruler, desires to establish lasting peace" by the "amalgamation of states under one superior power" - presumably their own. But Kant concludes that this effort "falls into anarchy after stifling the seeds of the good." ¹⁵ 

Boots on the ground

The movement for a liberal imperialism has an air of frustration about it. Proponents routinely admonish US leaders and citizens to "pony up" the resources, will, and moral courage to do the work of global management. In Haass' view:

The greater risk facing the United States at this juncture is that it will squander the opportunity to bring about a world supportive of its core interests by doing too little. Imperial understretch, not overstretch, appears the greater danger of the two. ¹⁶ 

Advocacy for this course seems to come in waves coinciding with sizable US troop engagements abroad - Bosnia in 1996, Iraq and Kosovo in 1998 and 1999, and Iraq again after 2003. A common target of enthusiasts is allied opposition to US interventions and also the domestic doubt and equivocation that have attended these interventions. And so it is this aspect of the project that seems pivotal: the willingness to put large numbers of US troops on foreign soil in a combat or constabulary role - and keep them there until stability and a new "rule set" takes hold.

In light of America's misadventure in Iraq - its great costs and poor results - it seems unlikely that the US public will be easily won to attempt similar experiments on a grander scale. Not even the "war on terrorism" or the notion of a "global Islamic insurgency" seem sufficient motivators. Certainly, our allies are less ready today, not more, to follow the United States down an imperial path, liberal or otherwise. Thus, even should the prospect capture the US public's imagination, it would further erode American influence abroad, adding to cost and friction.

The fact that the imperial option should gain a respectful hearing at this late date in human history is the best indicator that American policy has worked itself into a maddening cul de sac. As anyone who has driven into one knows, the way out is to reverse course. In terms of policy, this may mean trying something less ambitious than what we have attempted recently - and of an entirely different sort.

The first prerequisite of change is to rethink prevailing post-Cold War views on the utility of force.

Second thoughts on the utility of force

In an April 2003 speech before workers at a Boeing aircraft plant, President Bush asserted that,

"By a combination of creative strategies and advanced technologies, we are redefining war on our terms. In this new era of warfare, we can target a regime, not a nation." ¹⁷ 

This is the "new warfare hypothesis" and it did not originate with the Bush administration. In one form or another it has helped shape US thinking about the utility of force since the 1990-1991 Gulf War. More important than its pedigree, however, is the fact that it has proven false in its implications. Instead, our recent practice of war and military operations has shown that

• Military power is less discrete, manageable, and predictable in its effects than US post-Cold War policy presumes; and,
• Its negative effects are more far-reaching, costly, and complex than imagined by the new warfare proponents.
• Achieving positive ends by coercive means - compellence and control rather than deterrence and defense - has proven especially difficult and fraught with inadvertent consequences.

Programs of coercive social and political transformation in Iraq and Afghanistan have fallen far short of their goals despite the investment of 5,000 American lives (including contractors), one million personnel-years, and nearly $600 billion - as well as the expenditure of more than 20 kiloton of explosives.

"Boots on the ground" were supposed to rectify the shortcomings of wars fought at a distance with stand-off firepower. But rather than winning control, they have prompted nationalistic (or "communalistic") responses. Clearly, we have not understood the power and dynamics of "identity politics" - or how these react to efforts at coercive control by outsiders. This failure points to a more fundamental one: seized by a sense of military primacy, we have failed to appreciate the difference and the distance between achieving military effects and achieving political-strategic ones.

Any true reassessment of the utility of force and its limits leads to a re-evaluation of our present condition of "military primacy". It has become the cornerstone of our imagined role in the world - but what does it mean and what is it worth? In light of our Iraq experience, this much is clear: When weighing US military primacy, the most important comparison is not between the United States and other international actors but between means and ends - that is: between America's power and what it hopes to do with it.

NOTES

1. Colin Powell, My American Journey
(New York: Random House, 1995), p. 573. At the time, Albright was the US representative to the United Nations. Powell was then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. Richard N. Haass, "Imperial America," Foreign Affairs (11 November 2000).

3. War & Consequences: Global Terrorism has Increased Since 9/11 Attacks, Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo #38 (Cambridge MA: Commonwealth Institute, 25 September 2006).

4. Post-Cold War US Military Expenditure in the Context of World Spending Trends, Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo #10 (Cambridge MA: Commonwealth Institute, January 1997).

5. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, interview, "The Today Show" with Matt Lauer, NBC-TV, 19 February 1998.

6. Walter Scheidel, Republics between hegemony and empire: How ancient city-states built empires and the USA doesn't (anymore), Princeton/Stanford Working Papers in Classics (Stanford University, February 2006); Niall Ferguson, "Hegemony or Empire?", Foreign Affairs (September/October 2003); and, Paul Schroeder, "Is the US an empire?", History News Network, 3 February 2003, http://hnn.us/articles/1237.html.

7. Panegyricus of Isocrates (Cambridge: John Bartlett, 1854).

8. Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness", Policy Review (June/July 2002).

9. George M Cohen, Over There, sheet music (New York: William Jerome Publishing Corp., 1917).

10. Governor Bush Discusses Foreign Policy In Speech At Ronald Reagan Library (Bush/Cheney Campaign, 19 November 1999); http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/usa/1999/pr111999_nn.htm.

11. Thomas PM Barnett, Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating (New York City: Penguin, 2005); Robert D Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground (New York City: Random House, 2005); Michael Mandelbaum, The Case For Goliath: How America Acts As The World's Government in the Twenty-first Century (New York City: Public Affairs, 2005); Thomas PM Barnett, The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century (New York City: GP Putnam & Sons, 2004); Niall Ferguson, "Hegemony or Empire?", Foreign Affairs (September/October 2003), Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, "American Empire, Not 'If' but 'What Kind'," New York Times, 10 May 2003; Max Boot, "American Imperialism? No Need to Run Away From Label", USA Today, 05 May 2003; Thomas Donnelly, What's Next? Preserving American Primacy, Institutionalizing Unipolarity (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, May 2003); Michael Ignatieff, "The American Empire; The Burden," New York Times, 5 January 2003; Stephen Peter Rosen, "An Empire, If You Can Keep It," National Interest (Spring, 2003); Haass, "Imperial America," Foreign Affairs (11 November 2000); Robert Kagan, "Benevolent Empire," Foreign Policy (Summer 1998); and, William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs (July/August 1996).

12. Haass, "Imperial America," Foreign Affairs (11 November 2000). Haass also has led foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution and served in the State Department during both the George H.W. and George W. Bush administrations.

13. ibid.

14. Barnett, The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century (New York City: GP Putnam & Sons, 2004).

15. Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, September 2003), "First Supplement: Of the Guarantee for Perpetual Peace".

16. Haass, "Imperial America".

17. President George W. Bush, "Remarks to employees at the Boeing F-18 production facility in St. Louis, Missouri - Transcript," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (Washington DC: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 21 April 2003).

Citation: Carl Conetta, Cul de sac: 9/11 and the paradox of American power, Project on Defense Alternatives Research Monograph #13. Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth Institute, 05 February 2008. http://www.comw.org/pda/0802rm13.html

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The US mission in Afghanistan has run aground, too. Rather than spreading democracy, recent US military activism has helped spread chaos in several regions. It has tattered both our reputation and our armed forces. It has helped push Muslim populations toward Islamist politics, unsettled America's alliances, and prompted "balancing behavior" on the part of potential big power competitors: China and Russia. As for its impact on terrorism: terrorist activity and violence has grown worse, not better since 11 September 2001. Average levels of terrorist violence that would have been considered extreme in the period prior to 9/11 have become the norm in the years since. And there is no sign that this trend is abating.

The present course is not only counter-productive, but also fabulously expensive. Indeed, it seems to be delivering less and less security at ever increasing cost. Annual defense expenditures have risen by 50 percent in real terms since 2001 (and 78 percent since 1998). By the end of FY 2008, defense authorization will exceed $700 billion - significantly more than was authorized in any year since 1946. Expenditures of this magnitude are not easily reconciled with bringing national debt under control, while also meeting pending demands on Social Security and Medicare. These circumstances may soon force an economic reckoning for which the nation is ill-prepared.

With American security policy listing on the shoals, we might reasonably expect congressional leaders and presidential candidates to be vowing incisive action - a fundamental re-think, a new direction, something! But no such awakening is evident. Perhaps Democrats are not eager to interrupt the self-immolation of the Bush administration. It is easy enough to ascribe the lapse in thought to the vaudeville of American electoral politics. But, again, the problem is a more general one.

Lehigh University professor Chaim Kaufmann had it right when he wrote in the Summer 2004 issue of International Security that America's slide into the Iraq war evinced a broad failure in our vaunted "marketplace of ideas" - and not simply the perfidy of the current administration. Today, the market failure continues. Again and again, we are tempted to rash action by falsehood. Our policy discourse - in the media, academe, the halls of government, and the think tank world - seems perpetually locked and loaded. And the "military option" is always on the table, darkening the agenda.

And the future? What presently passes for the "cutting edge" in new thinking is a search for an imagined "middle ground" - a political safe harbor -- located somewhere between the errors of the present administration and those of the previous one. Emblematic of this is the view that sees America's troubles in Afghanistan and Iraq as largely a matter of execution and insufficient troop strength, that foresees our military occupation of those nations continuing for decades, and that pins its hopes for success on the enlargement of US ground forces and the renovation of counter-insurgency doctrine.

Most prescriptions for policy change still operate within the framework of a "war on terrorism" - a piece of strategic nonsense if ever there was one. Even worse is the slippery, indistinct notion of a "long war" against Islamic radicalism (or "jihadism" or "Islamo-fascism"), which seems tailor-made to tempt war with the Muslim world. Neither framework accurately models the current security environment and neither illuminates a productive, sustainable path to greater security.

Finally, and worst, are the ruminations about setting America on the path of "liberal empire" with US ground troops serving as the constabulary of troubled regions. The fact that the imperial option - which has advocates left, right, and center - should gain a respectful hearing despite the experience of Iraq indicates that the American policy community has worked itself into a dead end, a cul de sac. We cannot think outside the military option, the "big stick."

The problematic turn in US policy did not begin on 11 Sept 2001, or even on 7 November 2000. Recognizing this is the minimum requirement for exiting our current predicament. By the late-1990s, US security policy was already on a path that was counter-productive and unsustainable - not a wreck, but one waiting to happen. Defense budgets were already rising, but with little relation to actual threats. And America's world reputation was already eroding. Key precursors to current policy - unilateralism, offensive counter-proliferation, the "rogue state doctrine", and regime change - were already evident in US policy toward Iraq and elsewhere.

The 9/11 attacks may have stupefied the US policy debate, rendering it narrow, reactive, and timid - but there is a more fundamental and longer-standing problem. Since the end of the Cold War, much of the US policy community has been mesmerized by the advent of US military primacy and the advantages it supposedly conveys. This circumstance seemed to provide the leverage with which the United States might further enhance its security, extend its position of world leadership, and advance an American vision of world order - a "new rule set". The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review and US National Security Strategy went a step further, construing military primacy as essential to US global leadership and security - not just a fortuitous thing, but a necessary one. Thus, primacy became a security end in its own right and the cornerstone of our global policy.

Trouble is: primacy is not sustainable. Indeed, the more it is exercised, the more it invites balancing behavior on the part of others. Moreover, experience suggests that we have dangerously overestimated both the extent and utility of our military primacy. Nonetheless, our policy discourse remains entranced by it.

Militarizing policy

Hoping to realize the promise of military primacy, three successive US administrations have retreated from the idea that force should be an instrument of last and infrequent resort. Thus:

• The threshold for using force has steadily come down,


• The ways we imagine using force and our armed forces have multiplied,


• And our military objectives have grown steadily more ambitious - now including the aim of fighting multiple, overlapping wars to fast decisive conclusions, including regime change.

Beyond the traditional objectives of deterring and defending against aggression, there has been an increasing emphasis on trying to use force and forceful pressure to actually "prevent the emergence" of threats and, more generally, to "shape the strategic environment" (as the 1997 US Defense Review put it.)

In the past, threat prevention and "environment shaping" were largely in the purview of the State Department. But a feature of our post-Cold War practice has been the increasing intrusion of the Pentagon on the provinces of State. Parallel to this, diplomatic functions have been increasingly militarized. Thus, today coercive diplomacy plays a bigger role relative to traditional "quid pro quo" diplomacy. Similarly, "offensive counter-proliferation" has grown in importance relative to non-proliferation efforts. And even our programs in support of democratization and development have gained a khaki tinge.

Prevention or provocation?

Using military power to prevent the emergence of threats often implies treating actors who are not preparing or conducting an act of aggression as though they were. Preventative military operations target not aggression but, instead, the capability to aggress - be it existing, emergent, or suspected. Prevention can also target actors who we believe are disposed, due to the nature of their governments or belief systems, to do us some type of harm at some point in the future - that is, adversary regimes or movements, rogues and radicals.

Of course, treating potential threats as though they are impending ones can exacerbate tensions and precipitate the outcome that "prevention" is meant to preclude. Thus, in addressing the nuclear programs of both North Korea and Iran, our coercive efforts spurred, rather than retarded, the behavior we had hoped to stop.

Similarly provocative are some types of militarized "environment shaping" - what the Bush administration prefers to call "dissuasion." Armed dissuasion involves using military assets to "stake out" US interests in a specific situation or outcome. We might think of it as "preemptive deterrence" or "preemptive containment." Our worldwide military deployments, bases, exercises, assistance programs, and partnerships all serve a dissuasive function (among others). They are supposed to communicate implicitly that an undesirable competition or confrontation may ensue if another nation or actor undertakes a proscribed course of action.

Beginning in 1997, US strategy has seen the success of dissuasion as depending in large part on maintaining America's considerable margin of global military superiority. In accord with this, a key objective of dissuasion has been to discourage other countries from initiating arms competitions with the United States. How? By continuously widening America's lead with the aim of making competition seem hopeless.

Is dissuasion provocative or not? This depends in part on what behaviors it targets and what rules it seeks to set. Generally speaking: if dissuasive acts impinge on the internal affairs, sovereignty, core interests, or normal prerogatives of a target country, they are more likely to prompt resistance than compliance. The United States might effectively dissuade Chinese naval activism in the Caribbean, for instance - but not in the South China Sea. Likewise, if the United States seems to be claiming extraordinary rights or privileges through dissuasive acts, the targeted nations will either resist complying or strive to alter the power balance between themselves and America. This is precisely what China and Russia are attempting to do as the US network of bases and partnerships gradually surrounds them.

Enabling primacy

A key enabler for the broader and more frequent use of force is the notion that the United States has developed ways to fight fast, low-risk, low-impact wars. This is the "new warfare" hypothesis and it did not originate with the Bush administration. In one form or another, it has helped shape US thinking about the utility of force since the 1990-1991 Gulf War. However, what we have seen in Iraq and elsewhere is that military power is less discrete, manageable, and predictable in its effects than recent policy assumes. And its negative repercussions are more far-reaching and complex than imagined. Indeed, we have been treated to an exceptional lesson in how "precision warfare" can spawn chaos.

Putting "boots on the ground" in Iraq was supposed to rectify the shortcomings of wars fought at a distance with stand-off weapons - wars like the 1999 Kosovo conflict. But instead of giving us greater control, military occupation has prompted nationalistic responses and inflamed ethnic tensions. Clearly, we have not understood the power and dynamics of "identity politics". This failure points to a more fundamental one: Seized by a sense of military primacy, we have failed to appreciate the difference between achieving military effects and achieving political-strategic ones.

Any true reassessment of the utility of force and its limits must lead to a re-evaluation of our present condition of "military primacy". What does it mean and what is it worth?

Our distinct military superiority exists only in the conventional realm. Facing an unconventional foe in a complex contingency is another matter. And even in the conventional realm: potential adversaries do not have to match our levels of investment in order to boost the price of victory to unacceptable heights and, thus, effectively sap our superiority. It is worth remembering that the present global disparities in military power and investment do not reflect the global distribution of human and material resources. Many nations have considerable latent capacity to narrow the military gap between themselves and the United States -- if they are so motivated.

At any rate, when evaluating primacy, the most important comparison is not between us and other international actors, but between means and ends - that is, between our power and what we propose to do with it. The options range from simple defense and deterrence at one end to schemes of coercive national transformation on the other. If our Iraq experience teaches anything, it is that humility is in order. But this lesson is not likely to register in our policy discourse - not so long as it remains a prisoner to primacy.

Contact:
Carl Conetta
Project on Defense Alternatives
cconetta(at)comw.org
www.comw.org/pda

Citation: Carl Conetta, Prisoner of Primacy, Project on Defense Alternatives. Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth Institute, 07 December 2007. http://www.comw.org/pda/0712conetta.html

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1. Introduction: A Budget Reckoning on the Horizon

Since the end of the Cold War, successive administrations have been unable to produce a stable consensus on a military posture for which America is willing to actually pay, rather than borrow. Not even the 11 September 2001 attacks were sufficient to prompt such a consensus. Although defense spending rose precipitously following the attacks (and the subsequent Iraq war), so has the level of deficit spending

Annual defense expenditures have risen by 45 percent in real terms since 2002 (and 75 percent since 1998). They stand today at about $650 billion - not counting an expected supplemental request in September 2007. If we treat the Fiscal Year (FY) 1998 national defense budget as a baseline or "floor", and look at spending during the subsequent period 1999-2007, we see about $1.5 trillion in aggregate spending above that baseline. About 80 percent of this "spending above baseline" occurred after 2001. (Total national defense spending during the nine years 1999-2007 amounts to more than 3.9 trillion in "then year" dollars and 4.5 trillion in 2008 dollars).

The post-1998 defense boost has added to debt, rather than taxes, however - thus softening its political impact. Indeed, the Bush administration went further - mating its defense increments with a program of tax cuts, also born of borrowing, that is even more costly. And so, the historic tension between "guns and butter" has been mitigated by adding more than $3 trillion to the gross federal debt -- much of this borrowed from social security and other "trust" funds. This putative "solution" is not sustainable.

Very soon the amount of cheap credit available to the federal government from social trust funds will begin to decline; then it will disappear - probably around 2015. Thus, some variable in the current spending equation will have to give - and soon: defense spending, other federal spending, tax cuts, or current social security or Medicare benefits. To the extent that government focuses the pinch on variables other than defense - as the Pentagon might prefer - we can expect greater public sensitivity to the size of the Pentagon budget. Put simply: if taxes climb or services decline, the public will begin to feel the burden of the post-1998 defense budget increases.

Characteristically, the US public treats defense spending differently than other types of federal expenditure. The defense budget has a degree of immunity from simple trade-off calculations because (and to the extent that) it is viewed as essential to making secure all our freedoms and enjoyments. In this light, it is significant that, for the first time since the mid-1990s, a plurality of Americans - 43 percent - feel that the United States is spending too much on defense (according to a March 2007 Gallup poll).1 This, despite the long shadow of the 9/11 attacks and the efforts of the Bush administration to insulate the public from war costs. (The 2007 Gallup poll found that only 20 percent of Americans thought America was spending too little on defense. The split in 1993, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and America's triumph in the 1991 Gulf War, was 42 percent saying "too much" was being spent and 17 percent saying "too little".)

The shift in US public opinion that is already underway, together with the tightening of fiscal conditions in the future, will put substantial new political pressure on Pentagon spending. Fortunately, there are ample opportunities for safely achieving new efficiencies in America's military posture, while also reconfiguring it to more closely fit the current and emerging security environment.

In the sections that follow, this memo explores one option for reducing America's conventional military structure:

* Cut two (2) active-component USAF fighter wings, and
* Cut two (2) active-component USN aircraft carriers along with their associated air wings.

The resulting savings in procurement, personnel, and operations costs would amount to approximately $61 billion (in aggregate) over the next five years. Subsequent savings due to a smaller force structure would be somewhat less: about $6.65+ billion annually.

The proposed option is only illustrative, however. For several reasons, substantially greater savings should be possible - given strong and clear-headed political leadership.

• First, the proposed option focuses only on tactical combat air capabilities. Similar assessments are warranted across the full spectrum of US military capabilities, including strategic forces, surface and sub-surface naval combatants, air and naval lift, some ground force components, and various supporting structures and activities.


• Second, even with regard to tactical air forces, the proposed option only marginally rolls back some of the overmatch capability that the United States is adding to its arsenals (mostly by means of qualitative improvements to platforms and weapons). A closer look at the match between threats and defense capabilities, and a critical reappraisal of mission objectives, should permit some additional reductions in tactical air power.


• Third, reductions in force structure are associated with direct savings in personnel, procurement, and operations and maintenance. They also make additional savings possible in central support structures and functions - such as basic training, central logistics, and the military base infrastructure. The estimate given above for savings from the proposed cuts only marginally takes the latter type of potential savings into account because these are likely to be realized only in the case of a more comprehensive program of retrenchment and restructuring.

2. An option for savings: cut 2 Air Force wings, 2 naval wings, and 2 aircraft carriers

America's air and naval power provide the nation with a unique advantage in the military realm - at least as regards symmetrical opponents. The experience of the past 15 years has shown this advantage to be a paradoxical one, however. The capacity of our armed forces to interdict discrete targets from a distance is growing exponentially, while the types of threat vulnerable to such interdiction are declining. And, while America's capacity to quickly clear battlefields of traditional military foes has been amply demonstrated, its ability to translate battlefield victory into positive political outcomes has been cast in doubt.

In both of the US-Iraq wars, American airborne strike assets proved more than sufficient to quickly blunt and disable traditional mechanized forces, although the final destruction of adversary forces - the coup de grace - depended on the application of American ground power. And, of course, in the current Iraq war, the defeat of conventional forces did not spell the end of the conflict, but only a transition to irregular warfare. This is a form of war that will not be decided by America's great preponderance of airborne strike assets. Similarly, America's three air forces were able to destroy with virtual impunity a wide variety of deep and strategic targets in the 1999 Kosovo war and the 2001 Afghanistan war. Yet, again, in neither case could air power alone bring closure.

None of America's post-1998 wars have required US commanders to push deployed strike assets to their limits - despite target lists running into the thousands. Moreover: in none of the recent wars has the United States deployed more than one-third the strike assets it had available worldwide. This suggests that we have passed the limit of utility for the sheer aggregation of airborne strike platforms - which today number approximately 2150 fighters and bombers. Our shortfalls in war- and peace-making lie elsewhere.

For several reasons, the United States can afford to reduce its Air Force tactical combat fleet by two wing equivalents and its naval air power assets by two carriers (along with their associated air wings). The relevant considerations are:

1. Dramatic improvements in the target attack capacity of sea- and air-based platforms, relative to the changes in appropriate threats; and


2. New methods for more efficiently and flexibly meeting the needs for sea-based presence abroad.

2.1 The recent evolution of US air attack capabilities

At the time of the 1991 Persian Gulf war, less than 8 percent of America's combat aircraft - USAF, USN, and USMC - had the ability to deliver guided weapons autonomously. Since then, this capability has generalized throughout the combat air fleets, including large bombers. (The capacity of America's fleet of 97 mission-authorized bombers to precision munitions makes it, in this regard, the equivalent of more than 7 wings of tactical aircraft.)

Although the Government Accountability Office (among others) have challenged the most ambitious claims made for precision-guided munitions (PGMs), a non-controversial conclusion is that they allow a five- to eight-fold reduction in bomb expenditure to achieve a target effect similar to that achieved by the best non-guided methods. (The advantage may be somewhat less for area targets.) Also contributing to increased combat capability since 1991 has been the generalization of night-fighting and all-weather capabilities throughout the combat air fleets and significant improvements in target acquisition and data fusion and sharing.

In light of the advances in US air attack capability, it is not surprising that the 2003 Iraq war involved only one-third as many combat aircraft sorties as its predecessor and less than nine percent as many air-delivered munitions. Notably: the proportion of air-delivered munitions that were precision-guided grew from 8 percent to 68 percent. The number of fighters and bombers deployed by the United States declined from approximately 1,100 for the 1991 Gulf War to 655 for the 2003 war. And deployed aircraft were worked much harder in 1991 than in 2003: about 1.3 sorties per day per plane versus 0.9.

Looking forward to 2010, the advances in US guided-weapon attack capability will continue as the combat air fleets add all-weather munitions of substantially longer range, smaller size, and greater accuracy with more numerous and "smarter" submunitions. Over the next five years we will see the introduction of (or more general use of) extended-range, jam-resistant JDAMs, the Sensor Fused Weapon, the Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispenser, Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missiles, and the Low-Cost Autonomous Attack System. Perhaps most significant is the introduction of the GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) which, as noted by Defense Industry Daily, will "dramatically increase the strike capability of every combat aircraft in the US inventory." Indeed, theoretically, the SDB will increase the PGM carrying capacity of America's combat air fleets five-fold - from 8,000 weapons to 40,000.

In 2010, America's combat aircraft will possess twenty times the interdiction capability -- on average and unit for unit, as their 1990 counterparts. Currently planned US air forces will be smaller, however - resulting in an aggregate capability somewhat less than 15 times greater than in 1990.

By comparison, traditional conventional adversaries have not nearly kept pace with US developments. Already in 1997, the Defense Intelligence Agency had noted a 20 percent reduction in armor threats. More generally: the United States moved from spending only 80 percent as much on defense as its potential adversaries did in 1985 to spending 250 percent as much in 2001. Since then the gap has widened further. Today the United States accounts for more than 60 percent of all military modernization spending worldwide, while Russia and China, for instance, together account for less than ten percent.

The dramatic growth in the capability of US combat aircraft does not imply that a commensurate reduction in fleet size is advisable, however. Quantity of platforms remains an important factor in that flexibility increases with the size of air fleets and risk declines. The United States would not want to put its "eggs" in too few baskets. Still, some significant reduction from the presently planned fleet size is possible.

How much is enough? We can gain some insight from America's recent wars. During the past 15 years, the United States deployed air armada's of various sizes to fight its wars: 1,100 combat aircraft in 1991; 300 for Operation Allied Force (plus 200 allied); approximately 250 for Operation Enduring Freedom; and 655 for the main combat phase of Operation Enduring Freedom. The average number of combat sorties flown each day varied widely: 1,400 for Desert Storm, 140 for Allied Force, 82 per day for the first 78 days of Enduring Freedom, and 700 for Iraqi Freedom.

Given current capabilities and those new ones now emerging and being introduced, the United States might handle comparable contingencies with combat air packages comprising 200 to 500 fighters and bombers. With a future all-service force of 1,920 mission-assigned fighters and bombers, the United States could surge as many as 1,250 combat aircraft at one time - a sufficient number to handle multiple war and deterrence tasks. And this total is consistent with the proposed rollback in numbers of USAF and USN air wings.

2.2 Rethinking the demand for aircraft carriers: fewer will do

The proposed reductions affect not just aircraft, but aircraft carriers as well - and this deserves a closer look. Among US air power assets those that are carrier-based have a special role. Where access to land bases is limited, aircraft carriers can bring tactical air power within reach of enemy bastions. Together with other sea-based strike assets and long-range bombers, carriers can help overcome the anti-access challenge. But this fact should not exclude them from consideration for reduction. In fact, the United States has more of this asset than it reasonably requires. And, it is important to remember that sea-based air power is relatively vulnerable and expensive. Indeed, sortie for sortie, it costs more than twice as much as land-based tactical air - all things considered.

America's requirement for big-deck aircraft carriers can be divided into a "surge" requirement for crisis response and a peacetime requirement for continuous forward presence. Relevant to the surge requirement is the actual experience of recent wars. Three or four aircraft carriers were directly engaged in Afghan operations at any one time during October-December 2001. During the first phase of the 2003 Iraq war, four or five were engaged. During the 1999 Kosovo war, one.

In none of these wars were the engaged carriers employed to their fullest, however. For instance, during the first month of Operation Iraqi Freedom, naval fighters flew an average of 0.8 sorties per day. They are capable of flying two, at least - and the Navy claims they can do more, in a pinch. Looking to the future: The target attack capability of each air wing will increase significantly with the addition of smaller, longer-range, and more accurate PGMs. In 2005 Senate testimony, then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vernon Clark, asserted that the number of targets that a carrier air wing could attack per day would increase from 700 to more than 1,000 by 2010 - having already risen substantially from 200 in 1997. Implicit in this is the option to reduce the overall number of carriers and wings.

In its FY 2007 budget, the Navy asserts that, given an 11 carrier fleet, it can surge six carriers for war within 30 days and another within the next 60 days. This, as a result of its new Fleet Response Plan (FRP). This implies an emergency or "surge" utilization rate of 63 percent. A somewhat higher rate could be achieved through changes in homeporting arrangements, rotations of crews, further reorganization of maintenance schedules, and reduced utilization of carriers for simple presence missions. Some reform along these lines would allow a 9-carrier, 8-wing fleet to surge "five plus one" for crisis response. In 2010, these six carriers, fully utilized and equipped with weapons now being fielded or procured, should be able to strike well over twice as many targets per day as the five that deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Supplementing the future offshore strike capability of US carriers would be the long-range attack capability of America's bomber force - able in the future to carry five times as many PGMs as today (on average). Also supplementing carrier power would be the rest of the Navy's surface fleet and the four Trident submarines that have been reconfigured for conventional missions. The surface fleet is equipped with approximately 8,000 Vertical Launch Systems, which can fire Tomahawk missiles - as can the Tridents. The Navy is building its stock of conventional land-attack Tomahawks up towards a total of 6,000 or so. (Approximately 800 were used in Operation Iraqi Freedom.) Finally, the Navy will have mini-carriers to call on as well, once the new class of LHA(R) amphibious assault ships are commissioned. Among other aircraft, these will carry 20 F-35s.

With only eight active and one reserve big-deck carriers in the fleet, the Navy would not be able to keep more than 2.5 of them continuously "on station" during peacetime - even given recent FRP innovations. However, homeporting one more overseas would increase this number, as would a crew rotation scheme. At any rate, peacetime naval presence abroad need not center on aircraft carriers. This much is recognized in the Navy's new Global Concept of Operations, which allows for greater flexibility in assembling naval groups. Today, these include not only Carrier Battle Groups but also Expeditionary Strike Groups (built around amphibious assault ships), Surface Strike Groups (built around surface combatants), and independent operations by the Trident cruise-missile subs. These smaller, more varied, and more numerous groups allow for greater flexibility and more thorough coverage.

3. Calculating the savings

Cut two (2) active-component USAF FWEs (fighter wing equivalents)

• Steady state savings (long-term average annual): $2.65 billion per year;


• Average annual for FYDP period: $5.25 billion annually; and


• FY 2008: ~$4 billion

Cut two (2) active-component USN aircraft carriers and associated air wings

• Steady state savings (long-term average annual): ~$4 billion


• Average annual for FYDP period: $6.95 billion.


• FY 2008: ~$5 billion.

3.1 Cut two active USAF "equivalent fighter wings"

• This reduction would incur more than $1.65 billion in operations and supports savings annually - that is: savings from the personnel and the operations and maintenance accounts. (Savings per wing would be half this sum).


• Steady-state modernization savings (encompassing procurement and research and development) would slightly exceed $1 billion per year - or about $500 million per wing per year on average. About 60 percent of this sum would derive from cuts in planned procurement of aircraft. The remainder would derive from a wide assortment of equipment and material (mostly ammunition and missiles) used to enable the squadrons' operations.

An equivalent fighter wing comprises 72 Primary Authorized Aircraft. Associated with this are at least 40 spares, trainers, and test aircraft. Thus, cutting two air wings involves a reduction of approximately 224 aircraft in the currently planned fighter fleet.

Specifically: the proposed reductions would involve capping the planned F-22 fleet at 122 aircraft for a reduction of 57, which is 1.5 equivalent squadrons. Additionally, the planned F-35 purchase would be reduced by 167 aircraft (or 4.5 equivalent squadrons). Total modernization savings due to these reductions would be approximately $16 billion, and all might be realized between 2008 and 2011. Additionally, $200 million per wing might be saved every year due to reduced demand for other equipment and material.

Calculated in terms of "steady state" costs, the total savings from cutting two wings would exceed $2.65 billion per year - or $1.325 billion per wing. Against current plans, however, most of the procurement savings will be realized in the next four or five years - as noted above. The actual average annual savings for these years will be approximately $5.25 billion annually - or $2.625 billion per wing. Looking at FY 2008 alone, however: only $4 billion in savings can be realized this year.

3.2. Reduce the planned aircraft carrier fleet and air wings by two

• "Steady state" (or long-term average) annual savings would be approximately $4 billion (or $2 billion per aircraft carrier and associated air wing.)


• Average annual savings for the next five years would be approximately $6.95 billion. (This is a substantially greater sum than the "steady-state" figure because substantial ship and aircraft procurement costs will occur during the next five years under current plans.)


• Savings in FY 2008 would amount to approximately $5 billion. (FY 2008 savings are lower than the estimated average for the next five years because acquisition costs for the next CVN-21-class carrier have not yet begun to register substantially.)

The estimated savings from reducing the number of carriers and associated air wings involve three broad categories of expenditure: personnel, operations and maintenance, and modernization (including research, development, and procurement).

• Annual personnel savings for each carrier and associated air wing reduced would be $375 million; for the two carriers and air wings, the savings would be $750 million yearly. Commensurate with this, active-component US Navy end strength would decline by 11,000 personnel, approximately.


• Operations and maintenance savings would be $800 million per carrier (including associated naval air wing) per year - or $1.6 billion for two carriers and air wings per year.

Not included in this estimate are reduced costs for recruitment, training, or central administration and support. Potential savings in these areas might easily and significantly exceed $100 million per year, under this proposal. However, realizing this additional savings would require a separate "infrastructure reform" effort. Thus, the estimated additional savings are not included here.

Modernization savings involve not only the carriers themselves and their associated aircraft, but also a wide variety of other equipment and material not included in operations and maintenance budgets. Steady-state annual modernization costs are $858 million per carrier and associated wing. Thus, reducing the fleet by two of each results in a greater than $1.7 billion reduction in steady-state requirements.

In terms of ship building requirements: the United States could forgo the next two in the CVN-21 series for a potential savings of $26 billion over 9 years. Although most of these savings would be realized during the period 2010-2017, $200 million might be saved in FY 2008.

The estimated cost of planned air wings (including spares and training aircraft) is $6.29 billion each - or almost 12.6 billion for the two wings. The USN's evolving carrier air wings include, minimally: 44 fighter-attack aircraft, 10 electronic warfare and command and control aircraft, and 11 helicopters serving a variety of purposes. In addition to primary mission aircraft, the Navy purchases spares and trainers, which can increase the lot by as much as 80 percent.

With fewer air wings, the Navy would have a reduced requirement for purchases of F/A-18E/F and F-35 combat aircraft. The F/A-18 buy could be reduced by 65 aircraft for a savings of $4 billion. The F-35 buy could be delayed and reduced by 92 aircraft for a savings of $4.5 billion. The balance of savings in aircraft acquisition would involve the E-2C/D Hawkeye, SH-60R Seahawk, and EA-18G Growler programs.

Notes

1. Joseph Carroll, "Perceptions of "Too Much" Military Spending at 15-Year High," Gallup News Service, 02 March 2007; www.galluppoll.com/content/Default.aspx?ci=26761&pg=1&VERSION=p .

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What makes this result especially surprising is that few leaders in Congress and no one in the administration today argues that the United States can or should reduce military spending. Quite the contrary: leaders of both parties seem eager to add to the Pentagon's coffers, even as public anti-war sentiment builds. And Congress is not the only institution that appears insensitive to the shift in public opinion. The Gallup survey also drew little attention from the news media. Indeed, a Lexis-Nexis database search shows almost no coverage of the poll, which was released on 02 March 2007.

US military spending in comparative perspective

For FY 2008, the Bush administration has requested $647.3 billion to cover the costs of national defense and war. This includes the Defense Department budget ($483 billion), some smaller defense-related accounts ($22.6 billion), and the projected FY 2008 cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and counter-terror operations ($141.7 billion). However, it does not include non-DOD expenditures for homeland security ($36.4 billion) or the Veterans' Affairs budget ($84.4 billion). Nor does it include the request for supplemental funds for outstanding FY 2007 war costs ($93.4 billion).

The $647.3 billion request represents a 75 percent real increase over the post-Cold War low-point in national defense spending, which occurred in 1996. Today's expenditures are higher in inflation-adjusted terms than peak spending during the Vietnam and Korean wars - as well as higher than during the Reagan buildup. One way of appreciating the significance of this change is to view it in terms of world military spending. Whereas the United States accounted for 28 percent of world defense expenditures in 1986 and 34 percent in 1994, it today accounts for approximately 50 percent.

The authoritative reference work on military comparisons, The Military Balance 2007, estimates world military expenditure in 2005 to have been approximately $1.2 trillion. A plausible estimate for current world spending is $1.35 trillion. By contrast, the armaments and disarmament yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates 2005 world expenditure to have been slightly more than $1 trillion. The estimates differ in large part because the two data books rely on different standards of comparison: The Military Balance relies more heavily on "purchasing power parity" (or PPP) when comparing nations' expenditures, while the SIPRI volume uses exchange rates.

The change in America's proportion of world military expenditure is due partly to the resurgence in US spending that began after 1998, and partly to reduced spending by other nations. Significantly, the greatest average decline in spending has occurred in that group of nations that the United States might consider "adversaries" or "potential adversaries". China, for one, is spending much more than it did prior to 1990 - but "adversary spending" as a whole has receded substantially.

Spending versus strength

The turn in US public attitudes may reflect disenchantment with the Iraq war or a general sense that increased military spending is not bringing increased security. Clearly, the flood of defense dollars has not purchased stability in either Iraq or Afghanistan, nor has it led to a general decrease in terrorist activity. Indeed, the rate of terrorist incidents and fatalities has increased significantly since the onset of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars - even if one discounts terrorist activity occurring in these two countries.

Relevant to threat perception: the February 2007 Gallup poll shows that the proportion of Americans thinking that the country is "not strong enough" remains high: 46 percent. Only eight percent think the country is stronger then it needs to be. Comparable figures for 1993 are not available, but in 1990 public sentiments about spending and strength correlated much more closely. At that time 9 percent thought that the United States was spending too little and 16 percent thought it was spending too much. Regarding "strength": 16 percent in 1990 thought the country was stronger than necessary, while 17 percent thought it was not as strong as it needed to be. In the recent poll, by contrast, the public leans toward seeing spending as too high and strength as too little.

Clearly (and understandably) the American public continues to perceive a high-level of threat, even as it has begun questioning the current level of military expenditure. The unusual disjuncture between sentiments about "defense spending" and "strength" may reflect doubts about how the Pentagon is spending its funds or doubts about whether military dollars can purchase the requisite type of strength. Certainly, the Iraq and Afghanistan imbroglios suggest that the utility of America's military investments has distinct limits. This may create a basis of public support for political leaders attempting a more thorough security policy reform than they have been willing to contemplate so far.

Economic concerns

Economic concerns may also play a role in the public's thinking about defense spending. Although consumer confidence is higher in 2007 than it was in 2006, it still remains lower than during the mid- and late-1990s. In real terms, US median family income stagnated between 2000 and 2007, while personal debt rose. Now, rising interest rates are pinching the credit flow. Against this backdrop, the public may be taking a second look at the steep climb in military spending - up 45 percent in real terms between 2002 and 2008. Or perhaps the effect is more impressionistic: No matter how softly it is said, $647 billion sounds like a vast sum.

Currently the Pentagon plans to spend more than $2.75 trillion during the next five years - not counting the incremental cost of future combat operations. This is not easily reconciled with bringing the national debt under control, while also meeting pending demands on social security and medicare. There also may be detrimental macro-economic effects associated with the scale of federal deficits and debt - unless remedial action is taken. Concerns such as these recently led the World Economic Forum to lower America's competitiveness rating, dropping it from first place to sixth. Similar concerns have prompted the US Comptroller General and head of the Government Accountability Office, David M. Walker, to launch a public information campaign about the long-term threat to the nation's fiscal health. Such concerns may not yet figure substantially in the public's thinking about defense expenditures - but they are bound to play a bigger role as the "baby-boomer" generation begins to retire en masse.

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Certainly, boosting the Army and Marine Corps has a political utility for the President and his opponents, alike. But no one seriously contends that the initiative will relieve the stress of current Iraq deployments. Nor will it ease the strain of shipping additional troops to that country, as the President proposes. This, because any additions to Army and Marine Corps end strength must come in small increments, and it takes time to build new units. There will be no significant effect at all before 2009.

Looking down the road: the proposed additions to end strength will combine with other initiatives to dramatically increase America's capacity to sustain protracted ground operations overseas. The other relevant initiatives include the administration's Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy and various reforms aiming to increase the proportion of military personnel available for operational duties. Taken together these efforts eventually would allow the United States to comfortably deploy on a continuous basis more than 100,000 ground troops outside Europe, Japan, and Korea - while the latter locations absorb more than another 60,000 troops.

There is no manifest need for such a capability unless: (1) The United States maintains a large contingent of troops inside Iraq indefinitely, or (2) the nation aims to routinely and continuously involve 100,000 or more ground troops in regime change, foreign occupation, "nation-building", counter-insurgency, and/or stability operations.

The prospect of a long-term US troop presence in Iraq is not an idle one. Although proposals for beginning withdrawal have now become commonplace in Congress, few advocates talk about total withdrawal anytime soon - if at all.

Increasing Army and Marine Corps end strength will enable the United States to "stay the course" charted by the Bush administration in Iraq and elsewhere - indefinitely. Much as the proposed Iraq "troop surge" serves to counter a diplomatic solution to the Iraqi impasse, the proposed increase in Army and Marine Corps end strength serves as an alternative to setting a new course at the level of national security strategy.

Is "not enough boots on the ground" the chief lesson to learn from the Iraq debacle? A more critical view is that the administration's chief failure resides not at the level of war planning, but at the level of national security strategy. The failure involves misapplying and over-relying on military instruments. It rests on the mistaken belief that the type of enterprise represented by the Iraq war - forceful regime change and coercive nation-building - is necessary to our security and practicable. This belief is a fount of unrealistic goals and impossible missions.

Minimally, the nation and its armed forces deserve an open and thorough debate on the strategic lessons of the Iraq misadventure before we start ramping up the nation's capacity to put more boots on the ground worldwide. To foreclose this debate for reasons of political expediency is to add insult to tragedy.

The full version of this report is available at this link. The full version of the article contains expanded data and tabular presentation of currently deployed forces and alternative deployment possibilities.

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Key elements of the proposal:

■ Withdrawal of almost all US military forces from the country by mid-March 2008 - a necessary precondition of drawing Iraqi rejectionists into the political process;

■ Creation of a new multinational effort under the auspices of the UN Security Council and involving all of Iraq's neighbors (among others). The new mission would have separate sections addressing governance, development, and security;

■ Creation of a new International Security Assistance Force (ISAF-Iraq) under UN auspices and mostly comprising troops from Arab and Muslim nations not bordering Iraq. Additionally, Iraq would exchange substantial "military observer" missions with all of its neighbors;

■ Other initiatives aiming to draw Iraqi "rejectionist" elements into the political process would include an end to the de-Baathification campaign, a return to local Sunni authority in Sunni locales, full amnesty for all indigenous insurgents and militia personnel not charged with intentionally doing grave harm to noncombatant civilians;

■ The new mission will involve Iraq's neighbors in cooperative efforts to control Iraq's borders, reduce intercommunal tensions, and win the assent of Iraq's leaders to a new national compact. Winning the cooperation of Iraq's neighbors will require that some of their key security concerns be addressed. In the case of Syria and Iran, a de-escalation of other contentious issues is essential;

■ Between now and March 2008, the emphasis of US military activity in Iraq would shift to training Iraqi forces, redefining the security mission, and handing it off to the new international coalition. A few thousand US troops might remain in Iraq after March 2008 as part of ISAF- Iraq, but serving only in training, support, and observer capacities. The United States might also maintain a deterrent force in the region (but outside Iraq) comprising a ground force component of no more than 15,000 soldiers and marines (including those afloat).

Overcoming resistance and moving all Iraqi parties toward a "new beginning" for Iraq will depend on the political momentum gained from the prospect of US troop withdrawal, a reassertion of Iraqi sovereignty, and the combined influence of Iraq's neighbors.

Should Iraq's political leadership reject the path outlined above, they will have foreclosed the possibility of stabilizing the country any time soon. In this eventuality, the United States should withdraw its current mission and assume a regional posture that aims to contain and manage the situation from a distance. Also, regional diplomacy should take this eventuality into account now. Concerned nations should coordinate their responses to minimize the possibility of a broader war and ensure humanitarian relief.

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Operation Iraqi Freedom is not the type of folly that one can fix by staying the course. Nor can it be fixed by putting more shoulders to the wheel. Indeed, we cannot truly fix this disaster at all -- not without recourse to time travel. However, we can begin to repair the damage. And it is worth remembering that the United States and its armed forces rebounded relatively quickly from the Vietnam War debacle.

What is most important now is to recognize as bankrupt the Bush administration's crusader vision - its notions of coercive transformation. We must see and set a distinctly new course, beginning with Iraq.

Out of Iraq

Iraq's best hope for peace resides in a quick withdrawal of almost all US military forces from the country and their replacement by a new and smaller multinational force. "Quick" and "almost all" means a reduction to no more than a few thousand US troops by mid-March 2008 -- the fifth anniversary of the war's onset. Between now and then, the emphasis should shift to training Iraqi forces, redefining the security mission, and handing it off to the new international coalition.

Those few US troops remaining in Iraq after March 2008 should constitute a minority contingent within a multinational security assistance mission comprised principally of participants from Arab and Muslim nations. The United States might also maintain a deterrent force in the region (but outside Iraq) comprising a ground force component of no more than 15,000 soldiers and marines (including those afloat).

Iraq will continue to need substantial external assistance and support. However, a new multinational framework is essential. The current one -- which rests on US military power and entails American predominance in key areas of Iraqi life and governance -- is provocative and untenable. The Iraqi government will continue to suffer legitimacy problems until it becomes fully disentangled from the American mission.

A new framework of international support should be formed under the auspices of the UN Security Council (UNSC) with separate sections addressing governance, development, and security. This framework should incorporate and supercede all bilateral efforts. New security efforts, in particular, should centrally involve Iraq's neighbors.

Until these changes occur, "nationalist" and "rejectionist" sentiments and elements in both the Sunni and Shia communities will continue to prompt violence in Iraq, including cycles of communal conflict. By contrast, the international community - specifically, the Security Council and a consortium of Iraq's neighbor -- might use the prospect of US withdrawal as a lever to move Iraq's communities toward a new national compact.

The proposed approach constitutes a fundamental departure from the current failed course. Despite the risks it entails, it offers a last and best hope for stabilizing Iraq and substantiating its representative system of government.

For the United States, the proposed course assumes a devolution of its near-term goals for Iraq to the following: a unified, fully-sovereign, and fairly stable Iraq, possessing a representative form of government and posing no aggressive threat to its neighbors. We must set aside, for now, the goals of establishing in Iraq a model free-market economy uniquely open to globalization, or of marginalizing pan-Arab nationalist and Islamist ideologies, or of creating a base and a partner for efforts at regional transformation. All these things might be accomplished in the future, but only by means other than military occupation. One additional goal served by withdrawal and stabilization would be a reduction in the flow of terrorist volunteers. Al Qaeda would lose its principal recruiting tool.

The present approach is untenable

As early as Fall 2005, some coalition military leaders began to publically affirm that the coalition's presence in Iraq was "part of the problem." 2 In fact, it is -- or has become -- the determinate part.

That the American presence and mission are untenable should be clear from the fact that Iraqis readily blame the coalition, directly or indirectly, for most of their current difficulties, including the rise in communal violence and crime.3 A September 2006 poll of Iraqi public opinion found that 79 percent of Iraqis think the United States is having a mostly negative effect on the country; 78 percent think that the US military is provoking more conflict than it is preventing.4 A "hearts and minds" campaign cannot be won under these circumstances.

Especially in Sunni and Shia areas -- where US troops mostly operate -- Iraqis do not trust the coalition and want US troops to leave soon. The September 2006 poll found 71 percent of all Iraqis favoring withdrawal by September 2007. Among Sunnis the proportion wanting withdrawal was 91 percent; among Shia, 74 percent.

Most disturbing, support among Iraqis for attacks on coalition forces registered at 61 percent in the September 2006 poll -- up from 47 percent in January 2006. Among Shia, support for attacks is 62 percent; among Sunnis, 92 percent. A September 2006 poll for the Defense Department found somewhat lower levels of support for the attacks, but still quite disturbing: 75 percent of Sunnis supported them - up from 14 percent in 2003.5 An October 2006 poll by the British Ministry of Defense found similar results.6 And a January 2005 poll by Zogby International found that 53 percent of Sunnis supported attacks on US troops at that time.7

Generally speaking, Iraqi sentiments regarding the US presence have grown steadily more negative since the summer of 2003.8 And US military operations -- ranging from routine patrols and raids to major offensives and city sieges -- seem only to further alienate Iraqi opinion.9

Key aspects of an effective alternative

The power and appeal of "rejectionism" among Sunnis and Shia alike derive from the fact of the American occupation. The negative aura that surrounds the American presence also touches and tarnishes the Iraqi government, which is presently dependent on American power. And, because that government is dominated by Kurdish and Shia parties, the impression that it is "collaborationist" feeds communal tensions.

The key to ending civil conflict in Iraq and stabilizing the country is integration of the Sunni community into the political process as a full partner. Also essential is the fuller integration of the various Shia "Sadrist" trends. The occupation puts these goals out of reach. It makes it impossible to integrate the more "nationalist" of the Sunni insurgent groups. It also creates a base of support among Sunnis for Al Qaeda-linked terrorists. These latter are principally responsible for the mass attacks on Shia community, which drive the cycle of communal violence.

With regard to integrating Sunnis: what is most important is the co-option of "rejectionist" elements -- especially recalcitrant tribal groups and those indigenous insurgents not affiliated with Al Qaeda franchise groups. Desired immediate outcomes would be a substantial reduction in attacks on coalition forces, strong local cooperation in suppressing the activity of Al Qaeda-affiliated groups, and an end to terrorist assaults on the Shia community. Another near-term objective would be a quid pro quo "cease-fire" on the part of Sadrists and other Shia militants who target Sunnis.

To draw Sunnis into the new order it is essential that there be:

<> A timeline for the near-term withdrawal of almost all US troops, occurring in phases commencing almost immediately;
<> An end to the de-Baathification campaign; (Former regime officials formally charged with gross abuses of human rights might be prosecuted on an individual basis.)
<> A full amnesty for all indigenous insurgents and militia not charged with intentionally doing grave harm to noncombatant civilians; and,
<> A return to local Sunni authority in Sunni locales, including the formation of local security units

Winning the assent of Shia parties to some of these provisions will be difficult -- although the Sadrists and some Dawa leaders will welcome a timeline for US withdrawal. Here, the role of Iraq's neighbors -- especially Iran -- and mediating organizations, such as the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, will be pivotal.

Overcoming resistance and moving all Iraqi parties toward a "new beginning" for Iraq will depend on the political momentum gained from the prospect of US troop withdrawal, a reassertion of Iraqi sovereignty, a new national compact among Iraq's communities, and regional cooperation in securing Iraq's borders and reducing intercommunal tensions.

Winning the cooperation of Iraq's neighbors will require that some of their key security concerns be addressed. In the case of Syria and Iran, a de-escalation of other contentious issues is essential. Our disagreements with these states must come out from under the imminent threat of war.

The new security mission in Iraq

The new security mission should be under UN auspices and founded on a consortium of states including all of Iraq's neighbors and the permanent members of the Security Council. The central involvement of Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iran will allow for better control of external influences on the Iraqi security environment and will add powerful new capacities to influence decision-making in the Iraqi Shia and Sunni communities.

Iraq's Sunni and Shia neighbors can play a unique and pivotal role in stabilizing Iraq by cooperating to end intercommunal strife. And the United States should facilitate this cooperation.

On the ground, foreign advisors and troops may serve to train and assist indigenous forces as well as monitor military developments. In some areas, they may share primary responsibility for security. US and UK troops, however, should constitute only a small minority of the foreign contingent, mostly serving in support capacities.

Most of the foreign military personnel inside Iraq, and all of those serving as front-line troops, should come from Arab-speaking and Muslim states -- preferably from states noncontiguous with Iraq. For instance: Egypt, Morocco, the UAE, and Oman together should be able to deploy 60,000 ground troops, if supported. (Several of them together deployed nearly this many for the 1991 Gulf War. In aggregate, their ground forces are larger than America's.) Military and police training and development efforts might draw from a broader roster.

Of course, any new international force in Iraq should operate under a clear status of forces agreement with the Iraqi government.

As a confidence-building measure, all states participating in the security mission should agree to forego unilateral security-related efforts in Iraq. Instead, all efforts should be channeled through the international mission. Moreover, Iraq and its neighbors should agree to exchange substantial "military observer" missions.

Conclusion: Plan B

The proposed alternative depends on the willingness of Iraq's political leadership to risk a new course. There is no guarantee that they will assent. Should they reject the path outlined above, however, they will have foreclosed the possibility of stabilizing the country any time soon. Continuing the US mission under such a limitation would be counter-productive and contrary to American interests.

Should Iraq's leaders decide to foreclose the hope of progress, the United States should withdraw its current mission and assume a regional posture that aims to contain and manage the effluent from a distance. A deepening of Iraqi civil conflict might ensue -- at least for a time -- or it might not. Either way, a large-scale US military occupation of indefinite duration is not a cost-effective way of hedging against this eventuality. Air, naval, and ground force deployments outside Iraq comprising 50,000 personnel would comprise a very substantial deterrent and rapid response capability -- should the preferred course as outlined above prove impracticable. In addition, regional diplomacy should address a "Plan B" contingency, so that concerned nations might coordinate their responses and minimize the possibility of a broader war. Concerned nations should also make provisions for humanitarian relief and the care of refugees.

Seeing our way clear of the Iraq disaster and avoiding similar debacles in the future requires that US national leadership reject the war's originating error: the conviction that one nation might easily compel profound political, economic, and social transition in another at the point of a gun.

Notes

1. A cost benefit analysis of the operation with an addendum summarizing its effects on terrorism can be found in: Carl Conetta, Pyrrhus on the Potomac: How America's post-9/11 wars have undermined US national security, Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Report #18 (Cambridge MA: Commonwealth Institute, 5 September 2006). http://www.comw.org/pda/0609br18.html

2. "Government stunned by Army chief's Iraq blast," Daily Mail, 13 October 2006; Sean Rayment, "All British soldiers to be out of Iraq in 12 months," Telegraph, 8 March 2006; Mark Mazzetti, "Generals conclude U.S. troops foster insurgency in Iraq," Los Angeles Times, 1 October 2005; and, Sean Rayment, "British commanders condemn US military tactics," The Age, 12 April 2004.

3. Jill Carroll, "Ordinary Iraqis bear brunt of war," Christian Science Monitor, 15 April 2005, p. 6; Jack Fairweather, "Iraqis blame US for bomb attacks on army recruits," News Telegraph, 2 December 2004; Joseph L. Galloway, Jonathan S. Landay, Warren P. Strobel and John Walcott, "Blunders worsened America's problems in Iraq," Knight Ridder, 18 October 2004; and, Ian Fisher, "As Iraqis Become the Targets of Terrorists, Some Now Blame the American Mission," New York Times, 17 December 2003.

4. Program on International Policy Attitudes, The Iraqi Public on the US Presence and the Future of Iraq (Washington DC: PIPA, 27 September2006); Program on International Policy Attitudes, The Iraqi Public on the US Presence and the Future of Iraq (Washington DC: PIPA, 27 September2006); http://www.comw.org/pda/0609br18.html

5. John Simpson, "Iraq engulfed by tide of violence," BBC News, 22 September 2006; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5371394.stm

6. Sean Rayment, "Secret MoD poll: Iraqis Support Attacks on British Troops," Sunday Telegraph, 23 October 2005.

7. Survey Finds Deep Divisions in Iraq; Sunni Arabs Overwhelmingly Reject Sunday Elections; Majority of Sunnis, Shiites Favor U.S. Withdrawal, New Abu Dhabi TV - Zogby Poll Reveals (Utica, NY: Zogby International, 28 January 2005);
http://www.zogby.com/news/ReadNews.dbm?ID=957

8. Carl Conetta, What do Iraqis want? Iraqi attitudes on occupation, US withdrawal, governments, and quality of life (Cambridge MA: Commonwealth Institute, 1 February 2005); http://www.comw.org/pda/0501br17append.html

9. The problems posed by military occupation and the effects of US military operations on Iraqi public opinion are explored in detail in: Carl Conetta, Vicious Circle: The Dynamics of Occupation and Resistance in Iraq, Part One. Patterns of Popular Discontent, PDA Research Monograph #10 (Cambridge MA: Commonwealth Institute, 18 May 2005);
http://www.comw.org/pda/0505rm10.html

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